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From Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust:
Navigating the Public and Private Interests
in Public Trust Resource Commons
Erin Ryan*
This Article partners a summary of the Mono Lake story—one of the all-time great tales of environmental, property,
and water law—with additional historical context, expanded legal analysis, and new reporting on contemporary public
trust developments, especially Juliana v. United States and the unfolding atmospheric trust climate litigation. The Mono
Lake case and its progeny—in which the public trust doctrine has been applied in contexts ranging from takings litigation to groundwater management to fracking regulation and now to climate change—prompt reflection about the way
the public trust doctrine navigates complex conflicts between public and private rights in natural resource commons.
This treatment explores the origins of the public trust doctrine in Roman and British common law through its development in American law, including the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1892 affirmation of the doctrine as a background principle of
state law in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois. It then introduces the law of private water allocation in the eastern and
western United States—riparian rights and prior appropriations, respectively. It considers how the public commons theory
that underlies the public trust doctrine collides unapologetically with the privatization theory that undergirds the western
doctrine of prior appropriations, enabling academic analysis of how this conflict so famously played out at Mono Lake.
The Article summarizes the historical and judicial elements of the Mono Lake story, including the implications of the
court’s decision for understanding the public trust doctrine as a limit on sovereign authority. It summarizes the criticisms
that followed from advocates for property rights, the constitutional separation of powers, and environmental concerns, and
reviews the doctrinal progeny of the case, including the Scott River extension of Mono Lake to groundwater resources, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s application of public trust principles to fracking regulation, and now the atmospheric trust
climate litigation emerging worldwide.
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Environmental Law Public Trust Symposium for their invitation and helpful comments, and to Mallory Neumann, Jill Bowen, Taylor Schock,
and Jennifer Mosquera for their research assistance in support of this project. This essay distills work previously published in Erin Ryan, The Public
Trust Doctrine, Private Water Allocation, and Mono Lake: The Historic Saga of National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 45 Envtl. L.
561 (2015), together with new historical context and reporting on subsequent developments.
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Introduction
It is a pleasure to share with this symposium one of the alltime great stories of American environmental, property, and
water law—the saga of National Audubon Society v. Superior
Court, better known as the Mono Lake case.1 It recounts the
epic conflict over water between the city of Los Angeles and
advocates for the Mono Basin, the eastern watershed of the
high Sierra Nevada crest at Yosemite National Park, some
four hundred miles to the north. In 1983, the California
Supreme Court took the first steps toward resolving that conflict by drawing on an ancient common-law doctrine with
roots in early Roman and British law—the public trust doctrine—which entrusts the state to manage certain natural
resource commons for the benefit of the public. Since then,
the Mono Lake case has remained the leading example of
modern public trust litigation in the United States, inspiring
a new age of public trust advocacy throughout the country
and even the world.2
The Mono Lake story prompts reflection about the way
the public trust doctrine navigates complex conflicts between
public and private rights in natural resource commons, from
ancient protections for waterways to contested claims for
atmospheric resources. It is a wonderful tale to tell, and it is
also very dear to me personally, because it includes the case
that brought me into the law. During the aftermath of the
California Supreme Court’s decision in the case, I served as
an interpretive ranger with the U.S. Forest Service (Forest
Service) on the Mono Lake District of the Inyo National Forest. There, it was my job to share this story with the general
public, cast as “the Water Issue,” until it eventually inspired
me to leave the Forest Service for law school. Some twenty
years later, I had the opportunity to write the full history of
the case in a law review article3 that I was then invited to turn
into a book,4 and I am delighted to be able to share some of
that work as part of this public trust symposium.5
In this Article, I partner a summary of the Mono Lake
story with additional historical context, expanded legal
analysis, and new reporting on important public trust developments, including its application in takings litigation,6
to fracking regulation in Pennsylvania,7 groundwater in
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

658 P.2d 709, 13 ELR 20272 (Cal. 1983).
Nations as far distant as India have relied on the Mono Lake case to instantiate public trust principles in their own legal systems. M.C. Mehta v. Kamal
Nath, (1996) 1 S.C.C. 388 (India), in I United Nations Environment
Programme Compendium of Judicial Decisions in Matters Related to
the Environment, National Decisions 259 (1998) (discussing the role of
the public trust doctrine in Indian law and quoting the California Supreme
Court’s description of the doctrine in Mono Lake).
Erin Ryan, The Public Trust Doctrine, Private Water Allocation, and Mono Lake:
The Historic Saga of National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 45 Envtl.
L. 561 (2015) [hereinafter Ryan, The Historic Saga].
Erin Ryan, The Public Trust Doctrine, Private Water Rights, and Saving Mono Lake (forthcoming 2020).
This is in reference to the 2018 J.B. & Maurice C. Shapiro Environmental Law
Symposium, “The Public Trust Doctrine in the 21st Century” hosted at The
George Washington University Law School on March 15, 2018.
See infra notes 75–79 and accompanying text, discussing use of the public trust
doctrine to defend takings claims.
Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 47 ELR 20081 (Pa.
2017); Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 43 ELR 20276
(Pa. 2013). See infra notes 86–90.
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California,8 and the atmospheric trust climate advocacy
unfolding as this piece goes to press.9 Part I introduces the
public trust doctrine itself, including its origins in Roman
and British common law. I trace how the public trust doctrine has developed in American law since its reception in
the early 19th century, culminating in the U.S. Supreme
Court’s 1892 affirmation of the public trust doctrine in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois.10 From there, the Article
briefly introduces the law of private water allocation in both
the eastern and western United States, contrasting how the
public commons theory that underlies the public trust doctrine intersects with the privatization theory that undergirds
the western doctrine of prior appropriations. The discussion
there prepares us to analyze the conflict between them that
played out at Mono Lake.
Part II sets the stage for the case that followed, recounting the extension of the Los Angeles Aqueduct to the Mono
Basin, the impacts of diversions on the Mono Lake ecosystem, and how they galvanized a determined group of local,
state, and national plaintiffs to try and “Save Mono Lake.”
Part III begins the legal analysis of the Mono Lake case.
After summarizing the parties’ legal arguments, it reviews
the California Supreme Court’s groundbreaking conclusion and the legal aftermath that culminated in the Water
Board’s decision to limit water diversions as needed to protect Mono Lake.
Part IV analyzes the precedent created by Mono Lake. It
explores the nature of the public trust doctrine as a limit
on sovereign authority, highlights noteworthy legal innovations in the decision, and reviews doctrinal progeny of
the case, including the recent Scott River case extending
the Mono Lake rationale to groundwater resources.11 It also
summarizes the main schools of criticisms generated by the
decision, primarily among advocates for property rights,
the separation of powers, and environmentalists. Finally,
Part V considers the next generation of public trust advocacy following in the footsteps of the Mono Lake case, especially Juliana v. United States and related climate litigation
emerging worldwide.12 The Article concludes with reflections on the role of the doctrine in helping us navigate the
public and private interests in public natural resource commons more generally.

I.

Legal Doctrines Governing Public and
Private Interests in Water Resources

In the Mono Lake case, advocates invoked the public trust
doctrine to protect public law interests in the environmental
values associated with a navigable waterway against private
8.

Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., Case No.: 34-201080000583 (Cal. 3d App. Dist., Aug. 29, 2018) [hereinafter Scott River case].
See infra notes 284–89.
9. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 46 ELR 20072 (D. Or. 2016).
See supra Part V.
10. 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892).
11. Scott River, Case No.: 34-2010-80000583 (Cal. 3d App. Dist., Aug. 29, 2018).
12. See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, and the other atmospheric trust cases discussed infra Part IV.
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law claims to the actual water within it.13 To understand how
these public and private interests came into conflict at Mono
Lake, it is important to understand the different legal doctrines that govern water resources in the United States. This
part introduces the public trust doctrine, which establishes
public rights and responsibilities in water, and more cursorily, the law of private water allocation, which assigns private
rights to use the water within those waterways. And as the
Mono Lake conflict demonstrates, these two sets of laws will
not always play nicely.
Part I.A. introduces the public trust doctrine and its historical origins, tracing the public trust principle from ancient
Rome, through early British law, to its formal reception in
the United States. Because the law of private allocation also
plays an important role in the Mono Lake conflict, Part I.B.
provides a light introduction to the primary doctrines of
private water allocation: the riparian rights doctrine of the
eastern United States, inherited from British law, and the
prior appropriations doctrine that evolved later in the western United States.

A.

Legal Origins of the Public Trust Doctrine

Modern public trust principles, which assign state responsibility for natural resources held in trust for the public, are
most famously associated with American law.14 However, the
public trust doctrine has roots in some of the oldest doctrines
of the common-law tradition15 —with many accounts dating
its origins to early British law, and some all the way back
to ancient Rome.16 This section presents the conventional
historical account of the development of the modern public
trust doctrine.

1.

The Roman and Byzantine Empires

In the 6th century A.D., the Byzantine Emperor Justinian
I set to work codifying Roman Common Law of the previous era, for the combined purpose of fortifying legal educa13. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 726–27.
14. See, e.g., M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1996) 1 S.C.C. 388 (India), in I
United Nations Environment Programme Compendium of Judicial
Decisions in Matters Related to the Environment, National Decisions 259 (1998) (referring to the California public trust doctrine, as expressed in the Mono Lake case, in adopting similar public trust principles
as a feature of Indian constitutional law). See also Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating Standards, 82
Notre Dame L. Rev. 699, 701 (2006) (discussing American versions of
public trust doctrine in general, and referring to various expressions of the
trust as “public trust principles”).
15. See, e.g., Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471, 475 (1970) (laying the
seminal academic foundations for the public trust doctrine as a tool to aid in
the protection of natural resources, and crediting its origins to early British and
Roman law); but see James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A
History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 1, 21 (2007)
(critiquing the conventional account of this history).
16. J. Inst. Proemium, 2.1.1. (T. Sandars trans., 4th ed. 1867) (translation from
the Institutes of Justinian, by the Byzantine Emperor, Justinian I.). But see J.B.
Ruhl & Thomas McGinn, The Roman Public Trust Doctrine—Not Public, Not
a Trust, Not a Doctrine, But Not Nothing (forthcoming 2019) (critiquing the
standard account of the Justinian roots of the doctrine).
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tion and restating the law for enforcement purposes.17 In the
Institutes of Justinian, published in 533, he documented the
jus publicum, a principle addressing the common ownership
of certain natural resources: “By natural law, these things are
the common property of all: the air, the running water, the
sea, and with it, the shores of the sea.”18 Thousands of years
later, it is hard to know exactly how these principles helped
govern the Roman Empire,19 but this commanding early
statement of public commons has redounded through common-law jurisprudence ever since, in both judicial decisions
and constitutional affirmations.20 Analogous principles of
public commons ownership, especially pertaining to waterways, also appear in civil law countries with legal codes that
draw on ancient Roman law, including France, Spain, and
other post-colonial nations with related legal systems.21
In the Mono Lake story that is the focus of this Article,
we will hear a lot about the intersection of these public trust
principles with water resources, and indeed, the doctrine is
most often invoked in application to waterways. But before
moving on, we might pause here for a moment to acknowledge the very first item in Justinian’s list—“the air”—because
that will become an important element in the modern public trust developments reviewed toward the end of our story,
now that advocates are deploying public trust principles in
the context of climate governance.22

2.

The Magna Carta and Forest Charter

Some jus publicum principles were later incorporated into
early British law, beginning with the Magna Carta. In 1215,
King John of England issued the Magna Carta (Great Charter), promising his rebellious barons that he and all future
sovereigns would operate within the rule of law.23 Although
the Magna Carta was unsuccessful in the first instance, it
eventually provided the foundations of the modern English
legal system, and it is credited as a progenitor of Western
democracy and constitutional law.24 In addition to declaring
the sovereign subject to the rule of law, the Magna Carta also
set forth rights to speedy justice, to trial by jury, and against
unusual punishments.25 It also incorporated into English law
certain principles of Roman common law, including elements
of the jus publicum. For example, Chapter 23 of the Magna
17. Herbert F. Jolowicz & Barry Nicholas, Historical Introduction to
the Study of Roman Law 492−93 (3d ed. 1972).
18. Id.
19. See Huffman, supra note 15; Ruhl & McGinn, supra note 16.
20. See Ryan, supra note 4, at Chapter VIII (The Evolving PTD) (tracing the evolution of the doctrine in the U.S. and international jurisdictions).
21. See, e.g., Glenn J. Macgrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law: Historical Development, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines
That Don’t Hold Water, 3 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 513, 536–45 (1975), https://
ir.law.fsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1801&context=lr [https://perma.cc/
E9BF-2FQD] (reviewing Roman-inspired doctrines of public ownership over
navigable waterways in Spain, France, and other civil law countries).
22. See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 46 ELR 20072 (D. Or.
2016); discussed infra Part IV.
23. See Andrew Blick, Beyond Magna Carta: A Constitution for the United Kingdom (Bloomsbury, 2015).
24. See Doris Mary Stenton, Magna Carta, Encyclopedia Britannica, https://
www.britannica.com/topic/Magna-Carta [https://perma.cc/6ZXC-9QQ3].
25. Id.
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Carta required the removal of all weirs in the Thames and
Medway Rivers “throughout all of England” that interfered
with fishing or navigation.26 The Magna Carta was negotiated between a proto-public commons over navigable waters
for these purposes.27
The Charter of the Forest, added to the Magna Carta in
1217 by King Henry III, further protected public rights to
access natural resources on certain undeveloped royal lands
(not just forests), and it remained in effect for centuries thereafter.28 Re-establishing traditional rights of public commons
that had been eroded by William the Conqueror, the Forest Charter promised that the King would not interfere with
commoners’ rights to graze animals, forage, plant crops, and
collect lumber on open lands subject to Forest Law.29 Notably, this law still governs the New Forest territory in southern
England.30 While these provisions do not necessarily follow
from the Justinian references to common property in air,
water, and coastlines, they do express an early affirmation of
what would develop into more modern public trust principles
of public rights in natural resource commons.

3.

British Common Law

Early British common law also made reference to public
trust principles in a series of cases and authorities affirming
sovereign authority over submerged tidelands.31 In the 1611
Royal Fishery of River Banne case, the Kings Bench held that
while the beds of nonnavigable waterways could be privately
held, navigable waters were owned by the sovereign for public
use.32 Sir Matthew Hale, in his renowned 1670 Treatise on
English Maritime Law later described sovereign ownership of
tidelands in his account of the three different kinds of coastal
land: (1) that under the royal right (or police power); (2) that
available for public navigational access; and (3) that which
was privately owned.33
Critics of this conventional historical account, including
Prof. James Huffman, have pointed out that unlike contemporary statements of the public trust doctrine, Chapter 23 of
26. Magna Carta, Chapter 23 (Eng. 1215). See also Michael C. Blumm & Courtney Engel, Proprietary and Sovereign Public Trust Obligations: From Justinian
and Hale to Lamprey and Oswego Lake, 43 Vt. L. Rev. 1, 8–9 (forthcoming
2019) (discussing the implementation of Justinian public trust principles in
the Magna Carta).
27. Magna Carta, Chapter 33 (Eng. 1215). See also Blumm & Courtney Engel,
supra note 26, at 9 (discussing the implementation of Justinian public trust
principles in the Magna Carta).
28. Magna Carta, Chapter 12 (Eng. 1217). See Sarah Nield, The New Forest: Ancient Forest and Modern Playground, in 2 Modern Studies in Property law,
287, 294 (E. Cooke, ed. Hart 2003); Anne Bottomley, Beneath the City: The
Forest! Civic Commons as Practice and Critique, Vol. 5(1) Birkbeck L. Rev. 1
(2018). Nicholas Robinson, The Forest Charter and the Public Trust, 10 Geo.
Wash. J. Energy & Envtl. L. (forthcoming 2019).
29. See Dr. John Langton, The Charter of the Forest of King Henry III, in Forests
and Chases of England and Wales, c. 1000 to c. 1850, St. John’s College
Research Center, http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/forests/Carta.htm [https://perma.cc/
KLP2-M2A4].
30. See Nield, supra note 28, at 303.
31. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 711, 727–30 (1986).
32. 80 Eng. Rep. 540–43 (K.B. 1611).
33. Matthew Hale, A Treatise De Jure Maris et Brachiorum Ejusdem, in Stuart
A. Moore, A History of the Foreshore and the Law Relating Thereto
370−72 (1880).
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the Magna Carta protected only British nobility, rather than
the general public, and that the King’s prerogatives under
British common law did not include trust-like responsibilities until the 19th century.34 Others, including Profs. J.B.
Ruhl and Tom McGinn question the relevance of the Justinian statement of the Jus Publicum to actual Roman legal
practice.35 Indeed, it may be that the ideals of the Forest
Charter come closer to the public trust principles that would
ultimately evolve in the United States.36 Nevertheless, the
early American courts that adopted the public trust doctrine
referred copiously (and perhaps defensively) to its roots in
British law.37

B.

Reception in the United States

The principle of sovereign authority over submerged lands
was received in the United States through the individual
states’ reception of British common law, and it began making appearances in litigation in the early 19th century.38 The
American version of the doctrine expanded to embrace not
only the submerged lands beneath coastal tidelands, those of
principal value in Britain, but also those under other large
navigable waterways to which there were no true British analogs, including America’s Great Lakes and enormous rivers.39
In this way, the American public trust doctrine developed
beyond its British origins, although early American cases frequently referred back to Roman and English common law
for support. This section reviews the reception of the doctrine by individual states in their common law and constitutions, and its recognition by the Supreme Court in Illinois
Central Railroad v. Illinois.40

1.

American Common Law

In the 1821 case of Arnold v. Mundy, one of the first to refer
to the public trust doctrine’s Roman and English roots, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey quoted Justinian and the various limitations on the English Crown in holding that the
land and resources beneath navigable water—here, oyster beds—were common property.41 The plaintiff property
owner had purchased a farm adjacent to a navigable river,
where he planted oysters and staked off the resulting bed.42
He subsequently sued a defendant for taking oysters from
this bed, but the defendant claimed that he and all citizens
of the state had the right to take oysters where they would be
naturally present in a navigable riverbed.43 The Chief Justice
determined that the plaintiff must have title to the oyster

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Huffman, supra note 15, at 21.
Ruhl & McGinn, supra note 16.
Robinson, supra note 28.
Id.
For additional historical account of the early American public trust doctrine,
see Ryan, supra note 4, at Chapter II.
See Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892).
146 U.S. 387 (1892).
6 N.J.L. 1, 71–72 (1821).
Id. at 65–66.
Id.
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bed to prevail in his suit,44 but that he could not satisfy this
requirement, as his private rights extended only as far as the
landward side of the high-water mark.45
The Chief Justice found that the land under navigable
water is considered common property,46 and that proprietors
have no more power than the English crown to convert lands
beneath them into private property.47 Referencing Justinian,
the Chief Justice characterized common property as “the air,
the running water, the sea, the fish, and the wild beasts,”
and held that title to these were in the sovereign, to “be held,
protected, and regulated for the common use and benefit.”48
Writing with strong tones of judicial gravity, he concluded:
The sovereign power itself, therefore, cannot, consistently
with the principles of the law of nature and the constitution
of a well ordered society, make a direct and absolute grant
of the waters of the state, divesting all the citizens of their
common right. It would be a grievance which never could be
long borne by a free people.49

With these words, he became the first American jurist to
tie the public commons element of the public trust doctrine
to the orderly functioning of democracy.

2.

Affirmation by the U.S. Supreme Court

The Supreme Court first formally invoked the public trust
doctrine in 1842, in the case Martin v. Waddell, where it
affirmed the sovereign ownership of navigable waters and
their submerged resources, resolving another dispute over
oyster beds.50 The Court held that proprietors claiming title
to New Jersey oyster beds under a charter originally dating
back from the British King Charles to the Duke of York
could not prevail, because even a royal grant was subject to
public trust rights of common fishery for the common people.51 In defending its conclusion, the Court referenced the
presence of the doctrine in English law as far back as the
Magna Carta:
[T]he lands under the navigable waters [within the limits
of the charter] passed to the grantee, as one of the royalties
incident to the powers of government; and were to be held
by him in the same manner, and for the same purposes, that
the navigable waters of England and the soils under them,
are held by the Crown.
The policy of England since Magna Carta—for the last six
hundred years—has been carefully preserved to secure the
common right of piscary for the benefit of the public.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 9–10.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 71–72.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 78.
41 U.S. 367 (1842).
Id. at 407‒18, 423.
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[I]t would require plain language in these letters-patent [to
the Duke of York] to persuade . . . [the Court] that the public and common right of fishery in navigable waters, which
has been so long and so carefully guarded in England, and
which was preserved in every other colony founded on the
Atlantic borders, was intended, in this one instance, to be
taken away.52

Three years later, in Pollard v. Hagan, the Supreme Court
reached a similar conclusion on the basis of the same principles in resolving a dispute over the ownership of submerged
lands in Alabama and Georgia.53 The Court rejected an argument that territory in Alabama that had originally been ceded
by Spain should not be subject to the British rule of sovereign ownership of submerged lands.54 Instead, it determined
that when Alabama was admitted to the Union, it entered
on “equal footing” with neighboring states, such as Georgia, and thereby succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty,
jurisdiction, and eminent domain as these other states.55 The
Court held that the land under navigable water was reserved
to the states, and that new states have the same sovereignty
and rights over navigable waters as did the original states.56
By the late 19th century, it was well established among
American courts that the state holds navigable waterways
in trust for the public.57 The Supreme Court made its most
definitive treatment of the public trust doctrine in Shively
v. Bowlby,58 an 1894 case quieting title to submerged lands
beneath a state-sanctioned wharf on the Columbia River in
Oregon.59
In a meticulous exposition, the Court traced how the
doctrine of public rights in submerged lands had progressed
from English common law into the original thirteen states
and those that had followed, identifying the overwhelming
majority that had explicitly adopted the public trust. Citing both Martin v. Wadell and Pollard v. Hagan, the Court
once again affirmed that submerged lands had been held by
the English King for the benefit of the public,60 that those
rights became vested in the original states after the American
Revolution,61 and that all U.S. territory ever-after would be
subject to the same public trust limitations on submerged
lands.62 The Court held that whenever territory came into the
United States by whatever means, the same public ownership
of submerged lands below the mean high-water mark passed
to the federal government, held in trust for the new states
that would be carved from this territory.63
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 413−14.
44 U.S. 212 (1845).
Id. at 228−29.
Id. at 223, 228−29.
Id. at 230.
See Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization of Western Water Law: A Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 Envtl. L. 573, 580
(1989).
152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894).
Id.
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 49 (1894).
Id. at 14-15, 57.
Id. at 57.
Id.
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In so doing, the Supreme Court affirmed the general provenance of American lands submerged in navigable waters
(below the mean high-water mark) as owned by the sovereign
and held in trust for the benefit of the public.

3.

Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois

Although Shively v. Bowlby was the Supreme Court’s most
definitive treatment of the public trust doctrine, its most
famous statement of the doctrine came from a decision issued
two years earlier, the 1892 case of Illinois Central Railroad v.
Illinois.64 There, the Court provided a crisp statement of the
traditional public trust principles of American law:
[T]he State holds the title to the lands under navigable
waters . . . in trust for the people of the State, that they
may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce
over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the
obstruction or interference of private parties.65

In this seminal decision, the Court not only affirmed
sovereign authority over submerged lands, but clarified the
nature of its obligation to the public as trustee of those
lands.66 And indeed, the Illinois Central case demonstrates
just how powerful the public trust obligation can be.
To give a sense of the enormous power packed in this
seemingly simple doctrine, consider the striking facts of
the case. Boiling the story down to its core: in 1869, the
state legislature conveyed the bed of Chicago Harbor—the
most valuable submerged lands in all of Lake Michigan—
to a private railroad, presumably to spur economic development.67 The people of Illinois were dubious. While they
hoped economic development would eventually confer public benefits, the gift smacked of patronage and cronyism,
and it generated considerable public outrage.68 When both
the Chicago Tribune and the Chicago Times condemned
the conveyance, legislative support for the deal began to
collapse, and the Illinois House and Senate created committees to investigate the possibility of corruption.69 When
the legislative session finally turned over, one of the new
legislature’s first acts was to repeal the old legislature’s gift
to the railroad.70 Now the railroad was the outraged party,
and this famous litigation ensued.
In court, the railroad argued that the new legislature
lacked the authority to repeal the Chicago Harbor conveyance made by the prior legislature.71 The conveyance was
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

146 U.S. 387 (1892) [hereinafter Ill. Centr. R.R.].
Id. at 452.
Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 568.
Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 438–39 (making “a grant by the State, in
1869, of its right and title to the submerged lands, constituting the bed
of Lake Michigan”).
Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public
Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev.
799, 805–06, 840–42 (2004).
Id. (describing public outrage over the conveyance); id. at 889–90 (describing
legislative committees created to investigate potential corruption).
Id. at 911 (indicating the legislative turnover that followed); Ill. Cent. R.R.,
146 U.S. at 449 (“On the 15th of April, 1873, the legislature of Illinois repealed the act.”).
Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 438–39; 450–51.
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extremely valuable, and ordinarily, neither the government
nor any other owner can simply “take back” a thing of value
this way.72 However, the state defended itself by deploying
public trust principles as a novel legal shield. Conceding that
there might have been a legal problem if there really had been
a legal gift, the state argued that in this case, there was not
an actual problem, because—thanks to the public trust doctrine—there had not been any actual gift.73 The state effectively acknowledged that it may have looked as though the
previous legislature had conveyed the bed of Chicago Harbor
to this private party, but argued that in fact, no such thing
had happened.74 The bed of Chicago Harbor was subject to
the public trust doctrine—held by the state in trust for the
public—and therefore, as a matter of law, could not be conveyed this way.75
The state argued that the previous legislature had lacked
the power to make a gift of lands encumbered by the public
trust.76 Such an act would be ultra vires—literally, beyond the
authority of the state—at least without taking more heroic
measures to clarify why such an unusual conveyance actually did accord its public trust obligations.77 As a result, there
was no actual gift, and accordingly no harm in repealing it,
and therefore, no legal foul. The Supreme Court agreed with
the state’s argument, affirming the public trust doctrine as a
foundational element of state natural resources law.78
In doing so, Illinois Central enshrined the public trust
doctrine among what later Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence would refer to as the “background principles” of
state common law.79 In the early 1990s, the Supreme Court
clarified that takings liability applies whenever state regulation obstructs all economically viable use of private property,
no matter what public interests are at stake—unless the challenged regulation is already among the “background principles” of state property law that limit an owner’s reasonable
expectations about how they should be able to use their prop-

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Indeed—as any self-respecting toddler would know, “No take backsies!”
Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 439.
See id. at 439.
See id. at 439, 453.
See id. at 453 (“The trust devolving upon the State for the public, and which
can only be discharged by the management and control of property in which
the public has an interest, cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the property.
The control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost. . . .”).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Erin Ryan, Palazzolo, The Public Trust, and the Property Owner’s Reasonable
Expectations: Takings and the South Carolina Marsh Island Bridge Debate, 15 Se.
Envtl. L.J. 121, 123 (analyzing how the public trust doctrine operates as a
background principle of law that can constrain the reasonable expectations of
a property owner alleging a taking); id. at 137–40 (2006) (discussing use of the
public trust doctrine to defend takings claims by defusing the reasonableness
of claimants’ expectations). See also John D. Echeverria, The Public Trust Doctrine as a Background Principles Defense in Takings Litigation, 45 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 931, 931–34 (2012) (analyzing use of the doctrine as a takings defense
in light of two California cases that did not allow it); J. Peter Byrne, The Public Trust Doctrine, Legislation, and Green Property: A Future Convergence?, 45
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 915, 916 (2012) (suggesting that the doctrine be used as a
defense to innovative regulatory takings claims and to “sustain environmental
legislation against judicial hostility”). But see Barton H. Thompson Jr., Judicial
Takings, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1449, 1532–33 (1990) (criticizing use of the doctrine
to avoid just compensation for what otherwise looks like a taking).
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erty, such as the common law of nuisance.80 The Court’s old
recognition in Illinois Central that the public trust doctrine is
a foundational element of state law has renewed importance
since its newer takings jurisprudence expanded potential
takings liability for environmental regulations that interfere
with economic use.81 The doctrine is increasingly invoked
by state and municipal parties defending takings claims
against regulations involving construction on tidelands and
wetlands, public access to waterways, and interference with
water rights. So far, most cases have affirmed the doctrine as
a defense to takings claims in these circumstances, including
decisions in New Jersey, South Carolina, and the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,82 but the Federal Court of
Claims has rejected the background principle defense.83
More importantly, perhaps, Illinois Central demonstrates
that the public trust doctrine functions not only as a grant of
affirmative state authority over submerged lands, but also as
a limit on state authority with regard to the management of
those lands, because the state is required to manage them as
trustee for the public benefit.84 The public, as the beneficiary
of this trust relationship, is entitled to call the state to account
for errant management choices in the courts. If members of
the public believe the state has failed its obligations as trustee,
they can sue. Over the years, as plaintiffs across the country
have litigated to vindicate and define public trust obligations,
the doctrine has developed differently from one state to the
next. Some states protect different resources under the doctrine and some assign different levels of protection to common trust resources,85 but at a minimum, most share the
common principle of sovereign authority over lands beneath
navigable waters held in trust for the public.86
80. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–30, 22 ELR 21104
(1992). See also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626–30, 32 ELR
20516 (2001).
81. See, e.g., Echeverria, supra note 79; Richard M. Frank, The Public Trust Doctrine: Assessing Its Recent Past & Charting Its Future, 45 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 665,
682–84 (2012).
82. Esplanade Properties, LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2002)
(affirming the city’s refusal to allow construction of residences on an elevated
platform above tidelands, because the public trust doctrine vitiated any entitlement by the owner to build there); McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council,
580 S.E.2d 116 (S.C. 2003) (holding that the public trust doctrine properly
blocked tidelands development without compensation, even when the lands at
issue became submerged after the owner took title); Nat’l Ass’n of Homebuilders v. New Jersey, 64 F. Supp. 2d 354 (N.J. 1999) (rejecting a takings challenge
to a state agency rule requiring developers of waterfront property to provide
walkways along the water, because the public trust doctrine prevents owners
from claiming any entitlement to exclude).
83. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(dismissing a takings claim by a California irrigator required to create fish
passage lanes to satisfy the Endangered Species Act, but stating in dicta that
the public trust doctrine would not have barred the claim); Tulare Lake Basin
Water Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001) (in an opinion by the
same judge as Casitas, rejecting the state’s public trust “background principle”
defense against a takings claim by California irrigators after water delivery under a state contract was temporary suspended while the state complied with
restrictions under the Endangered Species Act).
84. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 571, 574.
85. See Ryan, supra note 4, at Chapter VIII (The Evolving PTD) (describing different versions of the doctrine in different U.S. states). For example, most states
protect public access to submerged lands below the high water mark, but New
Jersey protects access to dry sand beaches as well. Matthews v. Bay Head Imp.
Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 363 (N.J. 1984).
86. See Ryan, supra note 4, at Chapter VIII (The Evolving PTD).
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State Constitutions

Finally, it is worth noting that public trust principles have
been incorporated into a number of state constitutions
within the United States,87 even where the doctrine is also
part of state common law.88 Some constitutionalized versions
look very similar to the common-law statement of the public
trust doctrine affirmed in Illinois Central. For example, Florida’s Constitution includes a provision that recognizes public
ownership of critical water commons and confers traditional
protections for submerged lands beneath navigable waters:
The title to land under navigable waters, within the boundaries of the state, which have not been alienated, including
beaches below mean high water lines, is held by the state by
virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for all the people.89

Alternatively, some state constitutions have taken a more
modern approach, applying public trust principles to additional resources, or expanding protections for specific purposes. For example, Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution states:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic
values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural
resources are the common property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources,
the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for
the benefit of all the people.90

Pennsylvania’s super-statutory public trust doctrine,
known as the Environmental Rights Amendment to the
state constitution, recently played a pivotal role in a spectacular legal debate over the regulation of hydraulic fracturing (fracking), which is commonly used to extract natural
gas from the rich Marcellus Shale resources of the state.91 In
a move that surprised commentators, a plurality of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invoked the doctrine sua sponte to
overturn a state statute that had prevented municipalities
from regulating the location of fracking operations through
zoning.92 A few years later, a clear majority of the same court
confirmed that Pennsylvania is obligated to manage its state
parks and forests, including the oil and minerals therein, as
a trustee in accordance with the public trust principles of the

87. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 572−73. See also Barton H. Thompson
Jr., Environmental Policy and State Constitutions: The Potential Role of Substantive Guidance, 27 Rutgers L.J. 863, 866 (1996) (“[T]he ‘public trust’ doctrine
plays a constitutional role in most states even though less than a handful of
states refer to the trust in the constitution itself.”).
88. Klass, supra note 14, at 714.
89. Fla. Const. art. X, § 11.
90. Pa. Const. art. I, § 27.
91. John C. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a Constitutional Public Trust, 45
Envtl. L. 463, 464 (2015).
92. Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 43 ELR 20276 (Pa.
2013).
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Environmental Rights Amendment.93 They reasoned that the
clear language expressly affirms both the right of the people
to enjoy these public natural resources and the Commonwealth’s obligation to maintain them.94
Constitutionalized versions of the doctrine have thus provided additional means of protecting public trust resources
and expanded recognition for new public trust values
beyond those traditionally protected at common law. However, scholars like Alexandra Klass have expressed concerns
that the constitutionalization of public trust principles may
displace common-law versions of the doctrine, undermining
the further development of public trust principles through
traditional common-law processes.95 Some states, such as
Idaho, have committed the public trust doctrine to statute
specifically to prevent the further development of the common-law doctrine.96

C.

The Law of Private Water Allocation

This introduction to the public trust doctrine reveals it as a
public commons-based theory of public rights and responsibilities with regard to navigable waterways, and perhaps
other critical natural resources.97 However, at least when
applied to American waterways, the public trust doctrine is
inevitably destined to collide with a wholly separate body of
law, and one that is often based on a contrasting theory of
private rights. The law of water allocation, by which rights
are granted for the use or extraction of water from public
commons waterways, enables individuals and groups to claim
water for specific private purposes. Especially in the western
United States, these allocation laws are generally based on a
privatization model.98
The problem becomes immediately obvious: the water
governed under both sets of laws is, after all, the same exact
water. The water to which individuals and other entities can
obtain private rights of use under the law of water allocation is the very same water that makes up the waterways protected by the public trust doctrine. Yet, these two bodies of
law—the public trust doctrine and the law of private water
allocation—are doctrinally orthogonal to one another. Each
developed independently of the other, as though they have
neither a legal nor a substantive relationship at all.99

1.
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Riparian Rights

Like the public trust doctrine, there is regional variation in
the law of private water allocation. Water allocation is a feature of state law, and there is a notably different valance to
water allocation law in the eastern and western United States.
Eastern states generally follow a modern version of the original British doctrine of “riparian rights,” which assigns correlative rights for reasonable use of water resources among
all riparians along a watercourse.100 Under the riparian rights
doctrine, reasonableness is contextual, and generally determined by the total set of individual demands for the water.101
Many riparian rights jurisdictions have modernized the doctrine to de-privilege riparian ownership, allowing water to be
exported from the riparian tract and treating all users under
the same rubric for assigning claims.102
In most respects, however, both traditional and modern
riparian rights regimes take a public commons approach
to allocating the resource. These laws treat the water subject to allocation as a public commons or a common pool,
allocating correlative rights in water in which users’ rights
are limited by the rights of other users.103 As a rule, everybody has to share.104 For example, in 1888, the Connecticut
Supreme Court in Mason v. Hoyle enjoined one mill owner
from impounding a stream to the detriment of other downstream mill operators.105 Emphasizing the reciprocal nature
of rights and duties among riparian claimants, the court
articulated the five core principles for “reasonably” allocating water under the common-law “reasonable use” doctrine
of riparian rights:
(1) All riparians have an equal opportunity to use the
stream;
(2) No owner may use his own property so as to injure
another;
(3) Adjudicators should consider the character and capacity
of the stream;
(4) The burden of foreseeable shortages should be allocated
fairly among all riparians; and
(5) Customary practices provide a foundation for evaluating “reasonableness.”106

Modern riparianism jurisdictions continue to apply the correlative spirit of reasonable use riparianism in considering
93. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 47 ELR 20081 (Pa.
2017).
94. Id. at 916.
95. Klass, supra note 14, at 699.
96. Idaho Code tit. 58, ch. 12 § 58-1201–1203 (1996) (Chapter 12. Public Trust
Doctrine). The Idaho example is discussed fully infra notes 266–71. Klass,
supra note 14, at 718–19.
97. See Michael C. Blumm & Mary Christina Wood, The Public Trust Doctrine in Environmental and Natural Resources Law (2013) (discussing
application of the public trust doctrine to other resources, including wildlife
and atmospheric resources). See also Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d
1224, 46 ELR 20072 (D. Or. 2016).
98. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 576−78.
99. Id. at 576.

100. See Christine Klein et al., Modernizing Water Law: The Example of Florida, 61
Fla. L. Rev. 403, 406 (2009):
The wetter eastern states . . . view the right to use water as an attribute
of the ownership of riparian land. This is primarily a torts regime,
prohibiting one riparian landowner from inflicting unreasonable harm
upon another. In contrast, the arid western states historically have
followed the prior appropriation doctrine, protecting the right to use
water according to temporal priority of use.
101. Id. at 407.
102. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 576.
103. Id.
104. Klein et al., supra note 100, at 407.
105. 14 A. 786 (Conn. 1888); 56 Conn. 255 (1888).
106. Id.
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the interests of all claimants on a waterway before assigning definitive rights to any. For example, in the 2005 case
of Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters
North America, the Michigan Court of Appeals enjoined
some—but not all—of the Nestle Corporation’s claims
to withdraw water from a stream that also served boating,
swimming, fishing, wildlife, and aesthetic purposes.107 The
court emphasized its responsibility to fairly allocate water to
preserve as many different uses of a waterway as possible.108

2.

Prior Appropriations

Most states in the American West, however, allocate water
rights under an appropriative rights regime based on priority
in time—essentially ‘first come, first served.’109 Under this
pure “prior appropriations” doctrine, rights to appropriate
water from the public commons are not correlative, and earlier claims are not diminished by the needs of later-comers.110
Whoever is the first to take a defined quantity of water out
of the watercourse and put it to “beneficial use”—defined
as domestic or economically viable use—can claim a right
to continue withdrawing the same amount of water for the
same purpose, potentially indefinitely, and excluding all others who come later.111
In contrast to riparian rights, the prior appropriation doctrine takes a privatization approach to resource allocation—
the very opposite of the public commons approach.112 Not
only does the doctrine reward early movers, granting them a
protectable right to exclude those who seek to establish claims
afterward, it rewards those who fully remove the water they
claim from the waterway, leaving none behind for other uses.
At least historically, an appropriator must literally withdraw
water from the stream to perfect a claim; appropriative rights
were not available for instream uses like fishing, swimming,
for wildlife, or aesthetic purposes.
For example, in the 1882 case of Coffin v. Left Hand
Ditch Co., the first case to formally apply the new doctrine of
appropriative rights, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed
the rights of an irrigator removing water from the stream
over the claims of a downstream riparian farmer.113 The irrigator was the first to actually remove water from the watercourse, creating a right to continue appropriating that water
for himself regardless of the needs of a downstream user who
had failed to perfect an appropriative claim.114 Similarly, in
Empire Water & Power v. Cascade Town, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit applied the Colorado prior
appropriation doctrine to hold that the defendant hydroelectric power company could continue to divert water to its
reservoir, even though it would fully dewater the Cascade
107. 709 N.W.2d 174, 194−95 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
108. Id.
109. Klein et al., supra note 100, at 406 (“[T]he arid western states historically have
followed the prior appropriation doctrine, protecting the right to use water
according to temporal priority of use.”).
110. Id. at 408.
111. Id. at 408–09.
112. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 576–77.
113. 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
114. Id.
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Creek Canyon and waterfalls around which the plaintiff
resort town economy was centered.115
Some modern appropriative rights jurisdictions have
added additional statutory criteria, including a public interest analysis, that require consideration of additional factors
before new rights are assigned, but in most respects, the heart
of the analysis remains the traditional rules of prior appropriations.116 Many jurisdictions have also provided greater
statutory protections for instream flow values, mitigating
the enormous pressure to withdraw from the stream in order
to receive a legally protected water right—but even so, very
few states treat these the same way they do conventional
appropriations, and only three allow private parties to hold
them.117 A handful of especially confusing states, including
California, allocate water under both riparian and appropriative rights regimes simultaneously.118
Accordingly, while the public trust doctrine requires the
state to protect navigable waterways in trust for the public,
the doctrines of private water allocation—especially Western prior appropriations—govern how the state gives away
the waters within them. And while the public trust doctrine
and riparian rights doctrine are grounded in a public commons theory of waterways, emphasizing correlative rights
and shared duties, the prior appropriations doctrine tends
toward a pure privatization model—first in time rights to
exclude others.
For these reasons, a conflict between the public trust
doctrine and private water allocation law was inevitable,
especially in the arid West. There, state law applies a privatization approach to the allocation of water rights for water
taken from waterways at the very same time that it applies a
public commons approach to protect the underlying waterways—which are composed of the very same water.119 These
contrasting approaches set in motion a legal collision that
was inevitable—and the conflict erupted most spectacularly
at Mono Lake.

II.

Building the Los Angeles Aqueduct

The Mono Lake case reached the California Supreme Court
in the early 1980s, but the crisis that led to the case began
115. 205 Fed. 123 (1913).
116. See, e.g., Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441 (Idaho 1985).
117. Barton Thompson et al., Legal Control of Water Resources 216 (5th
ed., 2013) (noting that while most states now allow some sort of appropriation to protect instream flows, only Alaska, Arizona, and Nevada allow private
entitles to claim them).
118. In California, the owners of land abutting watercourses hold some traditional
riparian rights, which coexist with the more abundant appropriative rights that
are unconnected to riparian land ownership but subject to similar requirements
of reasonable and beneficial use. See Thompson et al., supra note 117, at 200
(discussing California’s hybrid system of water law); see also Cal. Const. art.
X, § 2 (confirming the protection of riparian rights and discussing the requirement of beneficial use). However, prior appropriations remains the defining
doctrinal approach in the state. See Thompson et al., supra note 117, at 208
(explaining how the doctrines interact with one another in California); see also
John Franklin Smith, The Public Trust Doctrine and National Audubon Society
v. Superior Court: A Hard Case Makes Bad Law, or the Consistent Evolution of
California Water Rights, 6 Glendale L. Rev. 201, 207–09 (1984) (outlining
the history of California’s dual water rights system).
119. Klein, supra note 100, at 406.
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almost a century earlier, when the growing city of Los Angeles first began to run out of water.
Potable water has long been considered “wet gold” in Los
Angeles, the second most populated desert city on Earth.120
Located on the southern California coast, Los Angeles is one
of the largest cities in the United States, with a metropolitan
population of about ten million people.121 The Los Angeles
River runs through the city, now mostly encased in concrete,
but has approximately enough water to supply a population
of only a few hundred thousand—a pretty large overdraft.122
For that reason, moving water to Los Angeles has been a California state priority since the turn of the last century, when
groundwater supplies began to run out.123
Los Angeles lies in the arid bottom of the state, far from
the many Sierra Nevada rivers that furnish northern Californians with more abundant water resources.124 However,
three snaking aqueducts converge at the city, delivering redirected water to the large population centers in and around
Los Angeles.125 The Los Angeles Aqueduct, tapping the eastern slope of the Sierra Nevada and Tehachapi Mountains,
runs four hundred miles north from Los Angeles all the way
to Mono Lake, which is due east of San Francisco, near the
California-Nevada state line.126 Today, it is flanked by the
Colorado River Aqueduct, which brings water from states to
the East, and the California Aqueduct, which taps the wetter, western slope of the Sierra Nevada Range. But the Los
Angeles Aqueduct is the oldest, the most colorful historically,
and doubtlessly the most notorious of the three,127 and with
it begins our story.
What follows in Parts II and III summarizes the Mono
Lake story, told in even greater detail elsewhere,128 to bridge
the historical and doctrinal material of Part I with further
analysis of public trust issues and new litigation developments in Parts IV and V. This part recounts the arrival of
the Los Angeles Aqueduct, first in the Owens Valley and
120. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 578. Among desert cities worldwide,
only the Egyptian city of Cairo boasts a larger population. See Marc Reisner,
Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its Disappearing Water 60
(New York: Viking Press, 1986).
121. U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts: Los Angeles County, California,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/losangelescountycalifornia,US/
PST045217 [https://perma.cc/2RCE-UQ6K].
122. See Kai Ryssdal, The Aqueduct That Gave Rise to Los Angeles, Marketplace
(American Public Media), Mar. 31, 2015, http://www.marketplace.org/topics/
sustainability/big-book/aqueduct-gave-rise-los-angeles [https://perma.cc/8B5
M-XA7T] (“As early as 1894, the city faced severe water shortages. Engineers
estimated that natural sources serving the Los Angeles basin could support a
population of 200,000 or so, in typical years.”); Reisner, supra note 120, at
61–62 (describing the Los Angeles River as the first local source of water and
how reliance on it became untenable as the population grew).
123. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 578.
124. See California: Physical Features, http://www.csun.edu/~cfe/maps/CA_Physical.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5K2-967Z].
125. See Cal. Nev. River Forecast Ctr., CNRFC Interactive Map Interface: Rivers,
http://www.cnrfc.noaa.gov (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
126. See Louis Sahagun, “There It Is—Take It”: A Story of Marvel and Controversy, L.A. Times, Oct. 28, 2013, http://graphics.latimes.com/me-aqueduct/
[https://perma.cc/VJU5-NJDY] (describing the path and history of the
Los Angeles Aqueduct).
127. American Society of Engineers, First Owens River—Los Angeles Aqueduct,
ASCE.org, https://www.asce.org/project/first-owens-river-los-angeles-aqueduct/ [https://perma.cc/S9LT-P2DP].
128. For the full story, see Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 578–603; Ryan,
supra note 4, at Chapters III-V.
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then the Mono Basin. It introduces the Mono Basin ecosystem and reviews the devastating impacts of water diversions
through the Aqueduct to Los Angeles.

A.

The Owens Valley

The Los Angeles Aqueduct now ends at Mono Lake, but
that was not always so. The first place the city looked to for
water was the Owens Valley, an unlikely oasis in the southern California desert, roughly halfway between Los Angeles
and Mono Lake. The first few chapters of this story center
on the Owens Valley and the devastating impacts that water
diversions posed for the local environment and economy
there over the first half of the 20th century. I have previously
chronicled these chapters in vivid detail,129 because they
are of cinematic proportions (indeed, this part of the story
inspired the film noir classic, Chinatown,130 starring Jack
Nicholson). While this Article will not re-tell the full Owens
Valley story that is detailed in prior work,131 I’ll give just
enough overview to provide needed context for the Mono
Lake chapters that follow.
The ten-cent overview is that state and city leaders were
seeking new water supplies for Los Angeles, and they realized that there was water to be had some two hundred miles
to the north, in a valley capturing rainwater from two surrounding mountain ranges.132 The Owens Valley lies in a
high-elevation desert, carved out by the improbably robust
flow of the Owens River. The river winds south between the
White Mountains to the east and the Sierra Nevada to the
west, culminating in the vast but shallow Owens Lake.133
A thriving agricultural community dependent on the river
developed alongside it, the only sweet water in the region.134
Los Angeles engineers realized that they could divert this
water south to Los Angeles using only the force of gravity,
rather than relying on the kind of expensive pumps that
would be required to move water from elsewhere.135 However, city leaders accurately predicted that the community
would be unlikely to just hand the water over when Los
Angeles announced its interest. Instead, they decided to
trick local community members into giving up their coveted
water rights.136
Agents for the city approached Owens Valley farmers
pretending to be farmers, and they gradually bought up
most of the farmland and associated water rights surrounding the Owens River. When it was too late to stop them,
they started diverting all available surface water south to Los
Angeles.137 When they needed still more water, they began
129. Id. at 580−89.
130. Chinatown (Paramount Pictures 1974).
131. See supra note 127.
132. Reisner, supra note 120, at 61–63.
133. Id. at 61.
134. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 583.
135. Id.
136. Eric Malnic, The Aqueduct: DWP Smoothes Out Rough Edges on the 74-Year
Old Engineering Marvel, L.A. Times (Oct. 18, 1987), http://articles.latimes.
com/1987-10-18/local/me-15046_1_los-angeles-river [https://perma.cc/7GMQZL5J].
137. Id.
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pumping ground water below their land and sent that south
as well.138 Before the local community had really figured out
what was afoot, the vast majority of the region’s water was
being redirected to Los Angeles, and the Owens Valley was
effectively divested of its water.139 Once the local farmers did
figure things out, they were enraged; they famously dynamited the Aqueduct, and the National Guard was called in
to restore order.140 Headline-making drama ensued, but at
the end of the day, Los Angeles secured the water rights, the
Owens River was diverted, and Owens Lake at its terminus
was drawn dry.141
Today, there is an expansive salt sump where the majestic Owens Lake once anchored the valley and its wildlife,
including vast populations of migratory birds that no longer
appear.142 The Owens Valley tragedy is compounded by the
fact that the exposed lakebed is composed of fine alkali salts
that are toxic to breathe. These very fine particulates are constantly being churned up by the strong winds whipping off
the vertical escarpment of the eastern Sierra Nevada, forming cancer-causing alkali dust storms.143 In fact, the Owens
Valley often ranks as the most polluted place in the United
States by particulate matter standards.144

B.

The Mono Lake Basin

Some forty years after the Aqueduct first began tapping the
Owens Valley, Los Angeles leaders realized that the growing
city still needed more water.145 They also realized that there
was a wealth of additional, unappropriated water in the next
watershed up from the Owens Valley, just two hundred miles
to the north—the Mono Lake Basin. This Section briefly
introduces the unique place that became the focus of the
famous public trust litigation in the Mono Lake case.
Mono Lake drains the eastern slope of the high Sierra
Nevada crest, just east of Yosemite National Park.146 To call it
a lake is almost a misnomer; it is more of an inland sea, twice
the size of the city of San Francisco, five times deeper than
the Great Salt Lake in Utah, and three times saltier than the

138. Id.
139. Id. (“Despite the outrage of Owens Valley farmers and the furor over Gen.
Otis’ potential profits, Los Angeles voters turned out on June 12, 1907, to
approve construction bonds by a margin of 10 to 1. Federal approval for the
municipal project was won in Congress two weeks later.”).
140. See Scott Harrison, Dynamite Attacks on the Los Angeles Aqueduct, L.A. Times,
Feb. 6, 2013, http://framework.latimes.com/2013/02/06/los-angeles-aqueduct-2/#/0 (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
141. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 586.
142. See Marith C. Reheis, Dust Deposition Downwind of Owens (Dry) Lake,
1991–1994—Preliminary Findings, 102 J. Geophysical Res. (Atmospheres)
25999–26008 (1997) (describing the post-aqueduct deposits of minerals accumulated in Owens Lake over thousands of years).
143. Sarah Kittle, Great Basin Unified Air Pollution Control District, Survey of Reported Health Effects of Owens Lake Particulate Matter, https://gbuapcd.org/
District/Background/ReferenceLibrary/pmHealthEffects.html [https://perma.
cc/5HMK-VU6Q].
144. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Owens Valley, CA Particulate Matter Plan,
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/www3/region9/air/owens/index.html
[https://perma.cc/G5RH-7EKS] (describing Owens Lake as “the nation’s
worst particulate air pollution problem”).
145. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 596.
146. See Sahagun, supra note 126.
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Pacific ocean.147 Estimated to be between one and three million years old, it is roughly tied with Lake Tahoe as the oldest continuous lake in North America.148 Like Owens Lake,
Mono Lake is a terminal lake, which means that water flows
in, but there is no way for the water to leave except by surface evaporation.149 For those three million years, water carrying trace elements and minerals has flowed into the basin
and then evaporated off the surface, leaving those minerals
behind to form a hypersaline body comparable to parts of the
Great Salt Lake.150 As a result, the Mono Lake Basin is not
only a very beautiful location, it is a unique ecosystem, the
site of important scientific research, and home to important
communities and cultures, including the Kutzadika’a Paiute
who have lived there for generations.151
Mono Lake is part of a unique ecosystem. The lake is too
salty for fish to survive, so the enormous lake contains not
a single species of fish—but they are plentiful in the feeder
creeks that carry snowmelt down from the adjacent Sierra
Nevada into the lake basin.152 Instead, the lake is home to
trillions of tiny brine shrimp, a species that exists only at
Mono Lake.153 Brine shrimp populate the lake so thickly that
if you took a coffee cup and scooped out some summer lake
water, there could be as many as ten or even twenty shrimp
in your cup.154 The lake is also home to hordes of tiny alkali
flies, which are tasty as pupae and have long been a dietary
staple of the local Kuzediaka’a Paiute community.155 The ecosystem is thriving, but simple: the flies and shrimp survive
on the base of the lake’s food chain, benthic algae, and virtually everything else in the ecosystem—including the native
people—survives by eating the flies and shrimp.156 There is
147. Compare Mono Lake Comm., Quick Facts, http://www.monolake.org/about/
stats [https://perma.cc/PK4K-TT5M] [hereinafter Mono Lake Facts], with
U.S. Census Bureau, San Francisco County, California, https://www.census.
gov/quickfacts/fact/table/sanfranciscocountycalifornia/PST045218 [https://
perma.cc/4SZ7-5QZ7] (noting San Francisco County’s land area is 46.87
square miles); Univ. of Utah, Physical Characteristics of Great Salt Lake, http://
learn.genetics.utah.edu/content/gsl/physical_char/ [https://perma.cc/KD7WAS7M] (comparing the depths of the Great Salt Lake and Mono Lake). See
also John Hart, Storm Over Mono: The Mono Lake Battle and the
California Water Future 5–7 (1996) (Univ. Cal. Press 1996).
148. See Hart, supra note 147; Tahoe Fund, Lake Tahoe Fun Facts, http://www.
tahoefund.org/about-tahoe/recreational-paradise/ [https://perma.cc/ZQ3UX7ZH]; Genetic Science Learning Center, Univ. of Utah, Physical Characteristics of the Great Salt Lake, https://learn.genetics.utah.edu/content/gsl/physical_char/ [https://perma.cc/YFD7-Z2UE].
149. Cal. Dep’t of Water Resources, The Importance of the Salton Sea and
Other Terminal Lakes in Supporting Birds of the Pacific Flyway 1
(Dec. 2004), http://www.water.ca.gov/saltonsea/historicalcalendar/docs/TerminalLakes.pdf.
150. See Hart, supra note 147, at 5–7; World’s Saltiest Bodies of Water, World
Atlas, https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-world-s-most-saline-bodiesof-water.html [https://perma.cc/G3LD-CJUX] (noting salinity ranges of the
Pacific Ocean at 3.5%, Mono Lake at 5-9.9%, and the Great Salt Lake at
5–27%).
151. See Hart, supra note 147, at 22–24 (describing the traditional lifestyle and
culture of the Kutzadika’a).
152. See id. at 16.
153. Mono Lake Comm., Brine Shrimp: Mono Lake’s Unique Species, http://www.
monolake.org/about/ecoshrimp [https://perma.cc/7HUT-D7VK].
154. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 590, 592–93.
155. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 711; Brine Shrimp: Mono Lake’s Unique Species, supra
note 153; Mono Lake Comm., Mono’s Alkali Fly the First Fly You’ll Ever Love,
https://www.monolake.org/about/ecoflies [https://perma.cc/SB88-G86B].
156. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 591–92.
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not much stabilizing redundancy if any of the basic elements
are compromised.
Mono Lake is thus a giant bowl of shrimp soup, deliciously garnished with alkali flies. As such, it attracts enormous flocks of migratory birds making their way along the
Pacific Flyway from as far north as the Arctic and as far
south as Latin America.157 The lake provides them a critical sanctuary during the vast desert expanse of their journey, allowing them to replenish themselves before continuing
on for many more hundreds of desert miles.158 Millions of
individuals from some three hundred species of birds come
to the lake.159 One of the islands in the lake is the breeding
ground for more than 85% of the California’s population of
California gulls.160 The freshwater creeks that feed the lake
are also important parts of the ecosystem, providing critical regional fisheries, riparian habitat for wildlife, and local
cultural values.161
Just south of the lake is the youngest volcanic range
in North America: the Mono Craters, a short chain of
10,000-feet-high volcanoes.162 These volcanoes are relatively
recent, and the chain ploughs right through the lake, creating the black and white islands within it.163 The volcanically
influenced chemistry and geology of the lake is so unusual
that it has been an important research destination for studying underwater volcanism, and NASA has even conducted
research at Mono Lake to imagine what life on other planets
with unusual terrestrial profiles might look like.164
Unlike Los Angeles, however, the Mono Basin is not a
major population center. The tiny town of Lee Vining is
located on the western edge of Mono Lake, just below the
13,000-feet peaks of the High Sierra.165 The town was home
to only 300 year-round residents when I lived there, but there
is some commercially valuable local industry. A nearby pumice mine harvests commercially valuable rock from the Mono
Craters.166 The brine shrimp plant on the western edge of the
lake harvests Mono Lake shrimp to be sold as freeze-dried
fish food.167 But the most important regional industry of all
are the surrounding public lands, including national and
state parklands that bring hundreds of thousands of visitors
to the Mono Basin each year from around the world, all to
157. Kevin Neal, TED Case Studies, The Los Angeles Aqueduct and the Owens
and Mono Lakes (Mono Case), http://archive.today/jhRr [https://perma.cc/
LX3Q-NNR5].
158. Mono Lake Comm., Birds of the Basin: The Migratory Millions of Mono, http://
www.monolake.org/about/ecobirds [https://perma.cc/3LG7-JALJ].
159. See generally Mono Lake Facts, supra note 147.
160. See generally id.
161. See generally id.
162. History: Evidence of Recent Eruptions, Mono Lake Comm, http://www.monolake.org/about/geovolcanic [https://perma.cc/JR6H-N73V].
163. Id.
164. NASA, Discovery of “Arsenic-Bug” Expands Definition of Life, NASA Science News, Dec. 2, 2010, http://science.nasa.gov/science-news/science-atnasa/2010/02dec_monolake/ [https://perma.cc/VCA8-MWNC].
165. See Lee Vining, California, City-Data.com, http://www.city-data.com/city/
Lee-Vining-California.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
166. See U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt. Map of Mono Basin, available at http://www.
blm.gov/style/medialib/blm/ca/pdf/bakersfield/geology.Par.25066.File.dat/
ovm07_geology_maps.pdf.
167. See, e.g., Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 719; Brine Shrimp: Mono Lake’s Unique Species,
supra note 153.

51

enjoy the stunning vistas, unique wildlife, fascinating geology, and cultural history of the area.168

C.

The Mono Basin Extension

When I was a grunt-level Forest Service ranger at Mono
Lake, I lived in the Ranger Station Barracks at the foot
of Lee Vining Canyon, the glacially carved route into the
High Sierra peaks at Tioga Pass. But practically across
the street, there was an official and foreboding sign that
warned, “City of Los Angeles—Private Property!” Indeed,
many decades before, Los Angeles had already managed to
acquire much of the privately available land there, in order
to secure the riparian rights associated with this land and
lay claim to the remaining water in the Basin under the
prior appropriations doctrine.169
The city accomplished this feat during the 1940s, in a
much less notorious way than it had acquired the Owens Valley water rights. Unlike the Owens Valley story, there were
no tricks or foul play, and no city agents masqueraded as
local farmers. Los Angeles simply announced its intentions
to appropriate waters that had been flowing, hitherto wasted,
into the useless salt lake, with plans to export it for more productive municipal use downstate.170 This was the easy part—
the water flowing into the lake had never been diverted for a
beneficial use cognizable under the doctrine of prior appropriations, so it was, for all legal purposes, available for new
claims by the first comer. And that comer just happened to
be the city of Los Angeles.
City officials also began acquiring all riparian lands
whose owners might someday lay claim to Mono Basin
water. They accomplished this mostly by consensual sales,
but where there was resistance, they made it known that
they would invoke the powers of eminent domain that are
statutorily available to California municipalities seeking
additional water resources, even extraterritorially.171 Ultimately, the city did have to resort to eminent domain to
acquire the property from a few local holdouts, and it prevailed in subsequent law suits.172
In this way, Los Angeles was able to acquire most riparian rights in the Mono Basin and assert appropriative claims
to the remaining water flowing into Mono Lake.173 However, there was one additional obstacle before water could
be sent south. Pursuant to California laws not yet in place
when Los Angeles began taking water from the Owens Valley, the city also needed the State Water Resources Control

168. See Peter Fimrite, Mono Lake Efforts May Be Undone by Park Closures, SF Gate,
July 24, 2011, https://www.sfgate.com/green/article/Mono-Lake-efforts-maybe-undone-by-park-closures-2353453.php (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) (describing Lee Vining as a “community that relies on the 271,000 annual visitors who
come to the area solely because of [Mono Lake]”).
169. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 596−98.
170. Id. at 594–95.
171. Id. at 597.
172. See also Andrew H. Sawyer, Changing Landscape and Evolving Law: Lessons
From Mono Lake on Takings and the Public Trust, 50 Okla. L. Rev. 311, 323–
24 (1997).
173. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 594−98.
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Board to sanction the new withdrawals with a permit.174 Yet,
the Owens Valley tragedy left the state water board genuinely torn about allowing the same situation to take place at
Mono Lake. Water board officials had just seen this sad story
play out just a few hundred miles to the south. They worried
openly about the same devastating harms befalling the Mono
Basin, and they even memorialized these concerns in their
final decision.175
Nevertheless, they granted the permits in full, concluding that under existing California water law, their hands
were tied.176 They believed that they had no choice but to
approve Los Angeles’ requested permits, because the city
planned to put unappropriated waters to beneficial use—
and municipal use at that, the most privileged category of
beneficial use.177 The Board read the California Constitution and water statutes to require the facilitation of municipal access to needed water resources as their highest legal
obligation.178 Accordingly, the Board issued the permits
in 1940, although even as it did so, its members enshrined
their grave hesitations in writing.179
With all legal approvals in place, the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (DWP), the agency charged with
securing and delivering water to the city, set to work completing the Mono Basin Extension of the Aqueduct. The Aqueduct would eventually extend to farthest reaches of the Mono
Basin mountain streams, and then shunt the water through
an eleven-mile tunnel underneath the dormant Mono Craters volcanoes that lay between Mono Lake and the upper
reaches of the Owens River. Infamously, construction of the
Mono Craters tunnel famously cost one man’s life for each
mile of tunnel—showing that water was even more valuable
than gold in California, worth its weight in human blood.180
Water began to flow south to Los Angeles, and the lake
gradually began to decline. As it had for the past three
million years, water in the lake continued to evaporate off
the surface, leaving dissolved salts behind. However, the
fresh water that once flowed down from the mountains
to replenish it was now being diverted directly from those
mountain creeks into a series of mechanical intakes.181
These intakes shepherded Mono Basin water under the
Mono Crater volcanoes and into the headwaters of the
Owens River, where it was routed into the original apparatus of the Los Angeles Aquifer.
Thirty years later, when continued development in Los
Angeles led the city to require still more water supply, DWP
realized that there was potential for yet more harvest from
the Mono Basin.182 Due to capacity limitations of the exist174. See William R. Attwater & James Markle, Overview of California Water Rights
and Water Quality Law, 19 Pac. L.J. 957, 972–73 (1988) (noting that the
Water Commission Act required permits to establish new rights in previously
unappropriated water).
175. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 595−96.
176. Id.
177. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 714.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 711, 714.
180. See Hart, supra note 147, at 43.
181. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 596−97.
182. Id.
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ing infrastructure, not all available water was being diverted
into the Aqueduct; some was still making it into the lake.
Accordingly, in the early 1970s, DWP solved this problem
by building a second aqueduct—the “Second Barrel” of the
Mono Basin Extension.183 The Second Barrel was essentially
another long tube paralleling the first one.184 With it in place,
Los Angeles was able to import between 12−20% of its water
supply from the Mono Basin, four hundred miles away.185

D.

The Impacts of Diversions in the Mono Basin

Mono Lake had been slowly declining ever since the arrival
of the Aqueduct, but when Second Barrel was installed in
1971, the lake began to decline much more quickly.186 In
1962, the lake had already lost twenty-five vertical feet from
its original elevation before diversions began in the 1940s.187
After the Second Barrel went in, the lake lost nearly as much
height in half the time. By the time of the litigation that followed in the early 1980s, the lake had lost forty-five vertical
feet and half of its entire volume to water exports through
the Aqueduct.188
As the lake declined, limestone tufa towers that develop
beneath the surface became exposed.189 These otherworldly
geological structures form at the mouth of underground
springs, where calcium-rich fresh water meets the carbonates suspended in the alkaline lake water, precipitating out
as calcium carbonate and growing only as high as the water
level.190 As the lake receded, the decline could be marked by
how much tufa had become exposed above the surface. One
famous cluster of human-height tufa towers near the north
shore became known as the “Benchmark” tufa, because
they provided a useful visual benchmark of Mono Lake’s
disappearance.191 In 1962, when the lake had lost twentyfive vertical feet, the tops of the Benchmark tufa were just
beginning to appear over the surface. By 1968, they were
exposed at the base, on a tiny island of relicted lakebed near
the water’s edge. By 1995, after twenty years of augmented
exports through the Second Barrel, they stood a mile from
the new shoreline.192
The falling lake level caused formidable air quality problems for the region, as lakebed that had been submerged for
millennia became increasingly exposed and airborne.193 The
bed of Mono Lake is similar to the toxic salt flats exposed
after Owens Lake was drained, except that Mono Lake is
much more alkaline, as it has been accumulating mineral
deposits for exponentially more time. Satellite images from
space revealed the emerging bathtub ring of white alkali salt
183. See Hart, supra note 147, at 56-57.
184. Id. at 42–43.
185. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 714.
186. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 590, 592–93.
187. See Hart, supra note 147, at 49, 51; Mono Lake Comm., The Mono Lake Story,
https://www.monolake.org/about/story [https://perma.cc/8D88-KHJB].
188. Mono Lake Facts, supra note 147.
189. See Hart, supra note 147, at 50–51.
190. Id.
191. See id.
192. See Andrew Ford, Mono Basin: Tufa, http://public.wsu.edu/~forda/tufa1.html
(last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
193. See Hart, supra note 147, at 52–54.
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flats as the lake declined,194 and the same air quality problems
that plague the Owens Valley began to threaten the Mono
Basin. Strong winds off the steep Eastern Sierra escarpment
spawned toxic dust storms that left the Mono Basin in frequent violation of the Clean Air Act.195
Meanwhile, the decreasing amount of water in Mono
Lake caused enormous problems for its ecosystem. When
the lake lost half its water volume to unreplenished evaporation, that caused the salinity of the remaining lake water to
double.196 The sharply increased salinity placed stress on the
brine shrimp, who had long thrived in the lake. I remember that they began to change color, turning slightly reddish, possibly indicating parasitic infections to which they
had become more vulnerable under stress. Their reproductive rate slowed down, threatening the simple Mono Lake
ecosystem and portending impacts for the millions of birds
who came to the lake for nourishment during their long journeys.197 Negit Island, the small black volcano that had been
the historic breeding ground for California gulls, became
bridged to the north shore, exposing the gulls to the coyotes
that regularly decimated the new chick populations.198 The
mountain creeks were desiccated below the diversion points,
destroying critical freshwater fisheries and riparian habitat.199
These environmental problems led to related issues for the
local community, including economic losses, threats to public health, and general quality of life impacts.200 As it became
increasingly clear that the Mono Basin ecosystem and community were on the brink of collapse, a concerned group of
scientists, environmentalists, landowners, and other local citizens decided to fight back.201 They formed the Mono Lake
Committee to advocate for the protection and restoration of
Mono Lake, ideally without transferring the same environmental problems to another remote location.202 They traveled the state, raising consciousness about the importance of
water conservation and the impacts of water diversions on
places like the Mono Basin, and advocating for legislation
to protect it.203 “Save Mono Lake” bumper stickers became a
common sight throughout California, and occasionally even
farther afield.204
The Mono Lake Committee operated on many levels
to save the lake, and one of the many ideas they pursued
194. See Maggie H. Villines, NASA’s Creature at Bottom of Mono Lake: Remnants of
Previous Earth Inhabitants?, Maggie’s Notebook, http://www.maggiesnotebook.com/2010/12/nasas-creature-at-bottom-of-mono-lake-remnants-of-previous-earth-inhabitants/ [https://perma.cc/RHA4-GTVR].
195. See Hart, supra note 147, at 154−55.
196. Id. at 69.
197. See id. (discussing shrimp reproductive issues).
198. Id. at 72, 88.
199. Id. at 54−56; Michael Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving
Public Trust in Western Water, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 701, 717–18 (1995).
200. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 597−98.
201. See Mono Lake Comm., History of the Mono Lake Committee, http://www.
monolake.org/mlc/history [https://perma.cc/25YM-EVYG].
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. Jane Kay, It’s Rising and Healthy: Three Decades Ago, a Bunch of College Students Reported on and Worried About the Fate of Mono Lake. This Month, They
Celebrated Its Recovery, SF Gate, July 29, 2006, http://www.sfgate.com/green/
article/it-s-rising-and-healthy-three-decades-ago-a-2515840.php (last visited
Apr. 17, 2015).
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was the litigation that is the next chapter of the story. They
centered their lawsuit on an idea inspired by a modest law
review article, authored in 1970 by Prof. Joseph Sax.205 In
the pages of the Michigan Law Review, Joe Sax was the first
to recognize that the public trust doctrine could require the
protection of environmental values associated with navigable
waterways.206 His insight that state sovereign authority over
navigable waterways could also imply sovereign responsibility for environmental protection was entirely new at the time,
but it would soon change the landscape of natural resource
management and water governance in California.207

III. National Audubon Society v. Superior
Court
Drawing on the insights of Professor Sax, the Mono Lake
Committee filed a lawsuit claiming that the state could not
allow the destruction of Mono Lake, a navigable waterway,
because it would violate the public trust doctrine.208 Their
lawsuit was eventually joined by a number of other environmental organizations and national and state agencies with
interests in the case, including the National Audubon Society, which helped fund it.209 But Los Angeles vigorously
defended the suit, claiming that there was no such violation,
and that California law guaranteed their ongoing rights to
continue diverting Mono Basin water.210 Reduced to their
essence, and with rhetorical help from the Illinois Central
case, here are the arguments they made.211

A.

The Legal Arguments

The plaintiff argued that the state of California could not
allow Los Angeles to continue water exports that were
destroying Mono Lake, a navigable water held by the state in
trust for the people.212 The city claimed appropriative rights
to this water, but the plaintiffs maintained that these rights
had been illegally granted in violation of the public trust doctrine, which prevents the state from alienating or allowing
the casual destruction of navigable waterways.213 The doctrine acts as a limit on state sovereignty, they argued, and
thus it must trump whatever appropriative rights the state
might try to grant in dereliction of its duty as trustee.214
205. Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471 (1970).
206. Id.
207. See id. I always make this point when teaching the Mono Lake case to law review editors—and especially the most beleaguered ones—to remind them that
what they are doing really is important, because law review articles really can
change the world!
208. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 716 (“[P]laintiffs filed suit for injunctive and declaratory relief in the Superior Court for Mono County on May 21, 1979.”).
209. Mono Lake Basin Water Right Decision 1631, 7, 19–20 (State of Calif. Water
Res. Control Bd. Sept. 28, 1994), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/publications_forms/publications/general/docs/monolake_wr_dec1631_a.pdf ) (hereinafter Decision 1631).
210. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 716, 727.
211. Id. For a fuller discussion of these arguments, see Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra
note 2, at 603–15; Ryan, supra note 4, at Chapters VI–VII.
212. Id. at 716.
213. Id. at 712.
214. Id. at 712−14.
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Because the state had an obligation to protect Mono Lake in
trust for the public,215 the Water Board, acting for the state,
lacked authority to permit Los Angeles to destroy it by draining it away.216
The plaintiffs argued that the original 1940 diversion
licenses had been granted in violation of the public trust doctrine, because the Water Board had failed to consider the
resulting harms to the public trust values it was obliged to
protect at Mono Lake.217 To support their contention, they
pointed to the Board’s own written record of its concerns
at the time, in which they had wrung their hands about the
apparent fact that there was nothing they could do to prevent the Owens Valley tragedy from being repeating at Mono
Lake.218 These writings either demonstrated that they had not
considered their obligations under the public trust doctrine,
or that if they had considered them, they ignored them.219
By my analogy, this was like the state of Illinois giving away
the bed of Chicago Harbor one hundred years earlier in the
Illinois Central case, which the Supreme Court had pointedly
affirmed the state could not do.
Los Angeles had a lot at stake, and it ferociously defended
the lawsuit. City leaders realized that if they lost, they not only
stood to lose up to 20% of their already strained water supplies. In addition, the negative precedent the case might create could threaten their ability to import other critical water
supplies from other distant, out-of-basin locations.220 From
their perspective, Los Angeles had complied with both the
letter and the spirit of California water law, which has always
sought to facilitate municipal access to water resources for
beneficial use in urban areas.221 They were even reluctant to
implement the water conservation efforts urged by the Mono
Lake advocates and incentivized by offers of state and federal
funding.222 The prior appropriations regime may even have
contributed to this decision, because as a “use-it-or-lose-it”
system, a user who manages to conserve water risks forfeiture
of their rights to use that water in the future.223
According to Los Angeles, then, the plaintiffs had it
all wrong. The city was hardly violating the public trust
doctrine, which protects only navigable waterways, and
the city was drawing water not from the hypersaline lake,
but Mono’s non-navigable feeder creeks.224 Moreover, Los
215. Id. at 728−29.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 712−14.
218. Id. at 714.
219. Id. at 712−14. By my analogy, this was like the state of Illinois giving away the
bed of Chicago Harbor one hundred years earlier in the Illinois Central case,
which the Supreme Court had pointedly affirmed the state could not do. Ryan,
The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 568.
220. Id. at 604.
221. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 604, 606–07.
222. Id. at 602 (2015).
223. Id. See, e.g., Salt River Valley Water User’s Assn. v. Kovacovich, 411 P.2d 201
(Ariz. 1966) (concluding that an irrigator who implemented water conserving
technology was not entitled to the conserved water under his appropriative
right). Today, most prior appropriation states have amended their water laws to
provide greater incentives for water users to conserve and protect them against
forfeiture. For example, California now entitles those who conserve water to
use, sell, or lease conserved water yielded by these efforts. Cal. Water Code
§ 1011.
224. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 716, 727.
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Angeles argued, the public trust was the wrong doctrine to
focus on. The dispositive law was that of prior appropriations, with which the city had diligently complied. It had
sought and perfected permits under California’s statutory
water code, and it was putting this water to municipal use,
the highest echelon of beneficial use.225 (It might argue that
the Illinois Central analogy would fail on this point, as this
was nothing like giving away Chicago Harbor: the city is a
public body, and this water was for the good people of Los
Angeles to drink!)
Even if none of that were enough, however, the city argued
that the plaintiffs could not rely on the public trust doctrine
to interfere with appropriative water rights, because of the
customary relationship between statutory and common
law.226 It argued that the California Water Code, incorporating the prior appropriations doctrine by statute, should
be construed to override the public trust doctrine.227 After
all, that is how the legal system ordinarily works: the common law fills gaps until the legislature passes a relevant statute, which effectively abrogates any contradictory common
law.228
In essence, then, the Mono Lake advocates argued that
the common-law public trust doctrine, in defining a core
requirement of state sovereign ownership of waterways,
should trump any contrary claims under the statutory law
of prior applications—while Los Angeles argued that the
prior appropriations doctrine, an abrogating act of statutory
law, should trump the common-law public trust.229 The two
parties deadlocked on the seemingly irreconcilable issue of
which rule of law reigns supreme.

B.

The Court’s Decision

The California Supreme Court issued a memorable opinion
that both affirmed and disappointed the central arguments
made by both sides. The prior appropriations statute does
not foreclose the common-law public trust doctrine,230 it
concluded, but neither did the public trust doctrine determine the future of California’s massive and entrenched water
works.231 Solomon-like, the court announced that neither of
the two sets of law at issue trumps the other, and that the state
must somehow find an accommodation between them.232
Its most significant holding, that the prior appropriations doctrine did not abrogate California’s public trust,
was cause for celebration among the Mono Lake Advocates.233 But the court declined their invitation to exalt the
public trust above all other considerations, holding that
the entrenched legal and mechanical infrastructure con225. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 604.
226. Id. at 607−08.
227. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 716, 727; Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at
607−08.
228. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 603.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 712.
231. Id. at 712, 727.
232. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 716, 727. For fuller analysis of the court’s decision, see
Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 605–11.
233. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 712.
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structed to move water resources around California could
not be wishes away, nor should it.234 The court observed
that the state is dependent on such waterworks, and that it
would be “disingenuous” to pretend otherwise.235 For that
reason, it concluded, the law cannot casually dismiss the
appropriative rights upon which holders, especially major
metropolitan areas, have come to rely.236
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the public trust
doctrine is also the law of the land, and that the state may
not ignore the obligations it imposes.237 While the doctrine
is designed to protect navigable waterways, the court recognized that under circumstances like these, the waterway
cannot be meaningfully separated from its non-navigable
tributaries.238 The court found that the state had clearly failed
to consider the public trust implications of the 1940 licensing
decision, and since the state cannot neglect its public trust
obligations,239 it must reconsider these licenses anew, weighing Los Angeles’ legitimate needs for water against the scenic, ecological, and recreational public trust values at stake in
the Mono Basin.240
Of note, the court did not provide much guidance about
how, exactly, the state should proceed in balancing legitimate
but incommensurate interests beyond the admonition that it
must. Analytically, it is useful to consider whether the decision creates a mere procedural requirement—a command to
think carefully before deciding to compromise trust values,
such as the “look before you leap” analysis required by the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)241—or
whether it creates a substantive command to protect public
trust values. The procedural requirement is clear, as the decision was premised on the state’s failure to consider public
trust obligations at Mono Lake in the original licensing decision. But was there more?
The decision is so understated on this point that it takes a
careful reader to find it, but the court did in fact articulate a
substantive, if weak, command—to protect public trust values as much as possible.242 The court directed that “before
state courts and agencies approve water diversions they
should consider the effect of such diversions upon interests
protected by the public trust, and attempt, so far as feasible,
to avoid or minimize any harm to those interests.”243 Requiring
the state to avoid harming trust values as much as is “feasible” leaves an awful lot to state discretion, but it does imbue
a substantive dimension to California’s public trust doctrine
that distinguishes it from the purely procedural requirements
of NEPA. Such breadth of discretion begs questions about
whether the command has real bite, but the court’s language
does provide both a moral impetus for state action and a legal
hook for public and judicial oversight.
234. Id. at 712, 727.
235. Id. at 712.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 728–29.
241. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370(h) (2012).
242. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728.
243. Id. (emphasis added).
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The Aftermath: The Water Board’s Decision 1631

After the California Supreme Court’s decision, the Water
Resources Control Board spent the next ten years trying to
calculate the proper balance between these competing interests. With the benefit of substantial research and exhaustive
public input, the Water Board eventually worked out a more
limited schedule of diversions that would allow Los Angeles
to continue taking water, so long as critical public trust values at Mono Lake remained protected.244 Famously known
as “Decision 1631,” the decision represented a compromise,
not unlike the Supreme Court’s decision.245 It set a designated
recovery level for the lake at 6,392 feet above sea level, a point
roughly between the original, pre-diversion lake level (6,417
feet) and the level at the time of litigation (6,372 feet).246
This 6,392-foot recovery level was chosen for several reasons. It would stabilize the salinity of the lake at a level the
brine shrimp could survive, thus protecting the fragile Mono
Lake ecosystem.247 It would cover the most hazardous salt
flats, limiting toxic dust storms and thus protecting the public health.248 It would also protect the scenic and recreational
values of Mono Lake, and with it, the local communities and
economies that depend on it.249 Finally, it would still allow
Los Angeles to export needed water supply, so long as designated benchmarks and recovery levels were met and maintained.250 Eventually, when the lake reached the recovery
level, exports would be unlimited, so long as the lake remains
at the target level.251 Twenty-four years later, the target has
still not been achieved; the lake currently averages around
6,381 feet of elevation, not quite halfway toward the goal.252
Unfortunately, California’s ongoing water woes and unpredictable weather patterns cast doubt on when, if ever, that
goal will be met.
Decision 1631 marked a true turning point for the Mono
Lake story, but an equally significant moment followed
shortly thereafter. While the court’s decision set forth rules
of law, it was the Water Board’s decision that would determine the actual fate of both the city’s water diversions and
the lake. All parties had awaited its ruling with bated breath
over each of the previous ten years. Everyone knew that from
the perspective of Los Angeles, giving up any claim to the
water the city had once relied on would be a painful loss.253
Los Angeles had fought the Mono Lake lawsuit with all its
might, because nothing made the city more vulnerable than
the loss of access to water. Moreover, given the reasoning
244. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 611.
245. Decision 1631, supra note 209, at 154–55.
246. Id. at 158.
247. Id. at 77–78, 82.
248. Id. at 3.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 156–57. Decision 1631 articulated a complicated series of interim
benchmarks and recovery levels with corresponding permissible diversions. Exports were initially prohibited until the lake level reached the first benchmark,
after which reduced exports would be permitted until the next benchmark was
reached, and so on. Decision 1631, supra note 209.
251. Id. at 156.
252. Mono Lake Levels 1979-Present, Mono Lake Committee, http://www.monobasinresearch.org/data/levelmonthly.php [https://perma.cc/NC5K-SCS7].
253. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 612–13.
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behind the court’s decision, Los Angeles now had to worry
not only about losing Mono Basin water, but potentially all
of its water supply—much of which was imported from distant watersheds.254
For that reason, when the Water Board ruled that the city
would have to stop exporting all Mono Basin water until
interim benchmarks were met, many perceived the decision
not as a compromise between the interests of both sides, but as
a serious loss for Los Angeles. The big question on everyone’s
mind was whether the city would appeal the Water Board’s
decision.255 That would have brought many more years of litigation, and even more serious environmental impacts for the
Mono Basin during the interim. Many observers anticipated
that Los Angeles, who had so bitterly fought the underlying
litigation, would certainly appeal.
Yet, in a remarkable turnaround, the city changed course.
Much like the citizens of Illinois in the Illinois Central story,256
the good people of Los Angeles voted in new city leadership,
and those new leaders took office with a new platform and a
new approach: Conservation.257
Rather than carrying on the same old battle, the city
decided to cooperate with the Mono Basin advocates they’d
been fighting in court, resolving to work together toward
increased water conservation in the Los Angeles basin and
restoration of the deteriorated resources of the Mono Basin.258
Instead of appealing Decision 1631, they took advantage of
the state and federal grants that have been previously offered
to implement large-scale water conservation projects.259
Through a series of programmatic conservation efforts, from
facilitating industrial water recycling to subsidizing low flush
toilet installation and other household-based limits on consumption, the city made remarkable progress—recovering
through conservation alone the entire loss of water supply
that had been coming from the Mono Basin.260 Los Angeles
deserves enormous credit for its leadership in water conservation and recycling ever since.

IV.

Unpacking the Mono Lake Decision

The Mono Lake case not only saved Mono Lake, it established
several important legal principles, interpreting the scope of
public trust protections for different values, in application to
different resources, and even the operation of the doctrine
over time. But before assessing them, I’d like to consider the
issue the court resolved that carries the most theoretical heft:
the implications of the decision for the legal nature of the
public trust doctrine itself.

254. Id. at 613.
255. Id.
256. See supra notes 60−85 and accompanying text, discussing Illinois Central.
257. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 612–13.
258. Id.
259. Hart, supra note 56, at 149.
260. Mono Lake Comm., Mono Lake FAQ: Frequently Asked Questions About Mono
Lake, http://www.monolake.org/about/faq [https://perma.cc/UVC4-QQPV]
(noting that Los Angeles conservation efforts have more than replaced water
no longer diverted from Mono Lake).
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The Nature of the Public Trust Doctrine

As noted, the court concluded that California’s statutorily
adopted prior appropriations doctrine did not abrogate its
common-law public trust doctrine, and that neither trumps
the other.261 Both sets of legal requirements must be considered together, and perhaps balanced against one another,
when the state makes management decisions about water
resources subject to the public trust like Mono Lake.262 Yet,
this grand gesture of legal compromise highlights a singular
feature of the public trust doctrine, and how it departs from
the usual legal norms. Because at first blush, Los Angeles’s
argument on this point seems correct—normally, statutory
law does trump the common law.263
This seemingly paradoxical result makes sense, however,
if the doctrine originated as a constitutive grant of authority and obligation regarding the management of public commons water resources. If the public trust doctrine serves to
both grant and limit sovereign authority—granting the sovereign ownership of these resources but obligating it to manage them in trust for the public—then, of course, it would
be self-defeating to allow the state to abolish the limit legislatively.264 Some have argued that this gives the doctrine
a quasi-constitutional foundation, an underlying legal constraint that statutory law can build upon but not undermine,
which makes it inherently different from more conventional,
garden-variety common-law doctrines.265 Some have argued
that this interpretation of the public trust doctrine is a necessary implication of the equal footing doctrine,266 which is
also recognized as a principle of U.S. constitutional law267—
even though, like the words “public trust,” the words “equal
footing” appear nowhere in the U.S. Constitution.
While many jurisdictions have followed California’s
model,268 it is important to note that at least one American
jurisdiction, Idaho, has taken a markedly different approach,
261. Id. at 727.
262. Id.
263. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 604.
264. Id. at 573−74.
265. See, e.g., Michael Blumm & Mary Christina Wood, “No Ordinary Lawsuit”:
Climate Change, Due Process, and the Public Trust Doctrine, 67 Am. U. L. Rev.
1, 43–44 (2017) (arguing that the public trust doctrine is “an inherent constitutional limit on sovereignty”); Michael C. Blumm et al., Renouncing the
Public Trust Doctrine: An Assessment of the Validity of Idaho House Bill 794, 24
Ecology L.Q. 461 (1997).
266. See, e.g., Michael Blumm & Lynn Schaffer, The Federal Public Trust Doctrine:
Misinterpreting Justice Kennedy and Illinois Central Railroad, 45 Envtl. L.
257, 400–01 (2015); James R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common Parentage
of the Equal Footing and Public Trust Doctrines, 32 Land & Water L. Rev. 1
(1997); Harrison C. Dunning, The Public Trust: A Fundamental Doctrine of
American Property Law, 19 Envtl. L. 515, 524 (1989).
267. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. See also Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 566
(1911) (interpreting the equal footing clause in reference to sovereign ownership of submerged lands).
268. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Clark Cnty., 254 P.3d 606, 613 (Nev. 2011) (“The final
underpinning of our formal adoption of the public trust doctrine arises from
the inherent limitations on the state’s sovereign power.”); In re Water Use
Permit Applications for the Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 432 (Haw. 2000)
(“[H]istory and precedent have established the public trust as an inherent attribute of sovereign authority.”); East Cape May v. State Dept. of Envtl. Prot.,
777 A.2d 1015, 1034 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2001) (noting that “tidally-flowed land
has always been subject to the public trust doctrine . . . [which] provides that
the sovereign never waives its right to regulate the use of public trust property”);
Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989, 994 (1987) (“The state can no more convey or
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prompting both political and scholarly controversy.269 After
the Idaho Supreme Court issued a series of public trust decisions converging on the California Supreme Court’s interpretation in Mono Lake,270 the state legislature enacted a statute
that expressly foreclosed this interpretive path.271 The legislation declared that the public trust doctrine did limit the
state’s ability to alienate title to the beds of navigable waters,
but that it had little impact beyond that,272 preventing the
doctrine from impacting the allocation of prior appropriative
water rights or state decisions about the commercial, agricultural, or recreational uses of public trust waterways.273
Environmental advocates and scholars condemned the
Idaho statute as an illegitimate legislative move,274 but in fairness, that depends on the nature of the doctrine at its core.
If the public trust doctrine does include a constitutive limit
on sovereign authority over natural resource public commons, then yes, the Idaho Legislature’s move to abrogate this
limit was ultra vires. That view is reflected in the California
approach, mirrored in other states with strong common-law
doctrines, such as Hawaii, New Jersey, and Washington, and
those with express constitutional trusts, such as Pennsylvania.275 But the Idaho Legislature treated the doctrine as just
another conventional expression of ordinary state authority,
which is normally subject to legislative change. The Idaho
example poses a strong challenge to the constitutive public
trust model, indicating both the variability of the doctrine
among U.S. jurisdictions and also this critical underlying
theoretical dilemma.
The contest between the California and Idaho models is
significant, because it reveals precisely this unresolved theoretical question at the heart of the public trust doctrine. Is it
a constitutive element of sovereign authority that cannot be
casually dissolved by the one wielding that sovereign authority at any given moment in time? Or is it an expression of the
state’s conventional police power to protect the public welgive away this jus publicum interest than it can ‘abdicate its police powers in the
administration of government and the preservation of the peace.’”).
269. James M. Kearney, Recent Statute: Closing the Floodgates? Idaho’s Statutory Limitation on the Public Trust Doctrine, 34 Idaho L. Rev. 91 at 94 (1997); Blumm,
Dunning, & Reed, supra note 265, at 472 (noting that the new statute “was the
legislature’s response to judicial public trust declarations” in a series of Idaho
Supreme Court cases).
270. See, e.g., Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass’n v. State ex rel. Andrus, 127 Idaho 239, 240
(1995) (suggesting that the public trust doctrine might be used to constrain
harm from logging activities to an impacted water body); Idaho Conservation League v. State, 911 P.2d 748 (Idaho 1995) (declining intervention by
environmental groups to raise public trust issues where state ownership was
not at issue, but suggesting in dicta that the public trust doctrine could take
precedence over vested water rights). See also Kearney, supra note 269 at 95−96
(discussing the reaction of the legislature to these cases).
271. Idaho Code tit. 58, ch. 12 §§ 58-1201−1203 (1996) (Chapter 12. Public
Trust Doctrine).
272. Id. at § 58-1201(4) and (6) (defines public trust doctrine as guiding alienation
of the title of the beds of navigable waters and clarifies that the purpose of the
act is to define limits on the public trust doctrine); id. at § 58-1203(1) (limits
the public trust doctrine to “solely a limitation on the power of the state to
alienate or encumber the title to the beds of navigable waters”).
273. Id. at § 58-1203(3) (does not limit the state to authorize public and private use
or alienation of title to the beds of navigable waters if the state board of land
commissioners determines that it is in accordance with Idaho statutes and constitution and for the purposes of navigation, commerce, recreation, agriculture,
mining, forestry, or other uses).
274. See, e.g., Kearney, supra note 269; Blumm et al., supra note 265.
275. See sources cited supra, notes 90 & 268.
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fare, which can always be revisited by future legislative decisionmakers? If we assume that the public trust doctrine in
every state evolved from a single, unified principle, then the
contrary approaches taken by these states pose a thorny legal
problem, because it would seem that they cannot both be
right. Either the doctrine originated as a modifiable expression of conventional state authority, or it has always been a
less negotiable constraint on sovereign power.276
If California is right, then unlike the conventional common law, the public trust doctrine represents a quasi-constitutional limit on sovereign authority that cannot be so easily
legislated away. But if Idaho is right, then the doctrine is just
another common-law rule that is forever subject to new sovereign consensus. Neither of these principles can reduce to
the other without constitutional change. The Idaho approach
could not legitimately evolve from the California model, nor
could the California approach evolve from the Idaho model,
because either path threatens conventional rule of law principles. At least in the United States, sovereign authority cannot free itself of constitutional constraints, nor does ordinary
common law assume constitutive status through conventional common-law processes.
The disjuncture begs the question: which is it? And indeed,
debate over the answer continues to unfold in centers of judicial, legislative, and executive decisionmaking across the
nation, especially prompted by the unfolding atmospheric
trust litigation.277 It demonstrates that the project of interpreting the public trust doctrine remains a work in progress,
and we are all bearing witness to this ongoing debate.

B.

Doctrinal Extensions on Values,Tributaries,
and Time

That statutory water allocation law did not displace the California public trust doctrine may be the most significant part
of the holding as a matter of legal theory, but the decision also
included several other important extensions of the doctrine,
expanding the scope of doctrinal protections to environmental values, non-navigable tributaries, and over time.278

1.

Environmental Public Trust Values

The one for which Mono Lake is most often celebrated is
the recognition that the public trust doctrine protects not
only the navigation and fishing values traditionally associated with the common-law doctrine but also the ecological,
276. If there is one, an alternative explanation would probably require the operation
of something like the controversial “Constitutional Moments” higher lawmaking hypothesis offered by Prof. Bruce Ackerman to explain the adoption of
constitutional principles outside the formal amendment process (justifying,
for example, the canonization of Fourteenth Amendment principles within the
U.S. constitutional framework notwithstanding problems with the post-civil
war amendment process). Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations
6–7, 110–11 (1991). Ackerman’s theory, of course, has itself been the object
of intense criticism. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Review: Constitutional Fact/
Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman’s Theory of Constitutional
Moments, 44 Stanford L. Rev. 759 (1992).
277. See infra Part IV.
278. For a fuller analysis, see Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 609−12;
Ryan, supra note 4, at Chapter VI.
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scenic, and recreational values at stake at Mono Lake.279 The
Mono Basin makes a great poster child for this proposition,
because it is such a visually stunning place, with a unique
and life-productive ecosystem, attracting hundreds of thousands of recreational visitors each year.
In this regard, however, Mono Lake is really just riding the
coat-tails of a slightly earlier California case, Marks v. Whitney, in which the California Supreme Court first allowed for
consideration of these extended environmental values.280 Mono
Lake was the later comer, relying itself on the precedent set forth
in Marks, but Marks was a relatively dry and technical case
that adjudicated rights of access to privately-owned tidelands,
about which ordinary people could not get terribly excited.281
Mono Lake has perhaps stolen Marks’s rightful thunder, but the
Mono Lake story was so much more engaging that it has come
to stand for this legal innovation in the public consciousness
more compellingly than Marks was able to do.

2.

Non-Navigable Tributaries

Notably, Mono Lake also extended the public trust doctrine
to the non-navigable tributaries on which a navigable waterway relies.282 Spanning 45,000 acres and reaching depths of
hundreds of feet, Mono Lake is unquestionably a navigable
waterway.283 It has been commercially navigated since the
time of the California Gold Rush, when it was used to transport logs from the Jeffrey Pine forest south of the lake to
Bodie, one of the principal Gold Rush boom towns north
of the Basin.284 Yet, Los Angeles was not diverting water
directly from Mono Lake, whose salty waters are manifestly
non-potable. Water was diverted from the freshwater Mono
Basin creeks that flow down from the Sierra Nevada into
the lake, and these steep, rocky creeks were not navigable at
the point of diversion.285 Los Angeles attempted to leverage
this distinction, but the Court held that the tributaries of a
protected waterway must also be protected if the alternative
would result in the destruction of the protected waterway.286
The extension of public trust protection to non-navigable
tributaries at Mono Lake continues to play a pivotal role
in the unfolding power of the doctrine to protect California waterways. Most recently, the Mono Lake case proved
foundational in a public trust decision extending the nonnavigable tributary rule to groundwater.287 The Scott River
in central California is a navigable river substantially fed by
groundwater sources, and the river has declined seriously as
these sources are increasingly exploited.288 The plaintiffs in
279. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 606; Blumm, supra note 8, at 591;
Frank, supra note 81, at 670; Timothy J. Conway, National Audubon Society
v. Superior Court: The Expanding Public Trust Doctrine, 14 Envtl. L. 617, 631
(1984).
280. 491 P.2d 374, 380, 2 ELR 20049 (Cal. 1971) (expanding public trust protections to ecological, habitat, open space, climatic, and scenic values).
281. See id.
282. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 720–21.
283. Hart, supra note 56, at 24–25.
284. Id.
285. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 607−10.
286. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 721.
287. Scott River, Case No.: 34-2010-80000583 (Cal. 3d App. Dist., Aug. 29, 2018).
288. Id. at 2.
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the Scott River case sought to extend the Mono Lake rule to
groundwater on exactly the same theory—that even though
groundwater tributaries are non-navigable, withdrawals
must be limited to protect the navigable waterway that
depends on them.
In 2018, the California Court of Appeals affirmed that the
state has the authority and obligation under the public trust
doctrine to regulate extractions of groundwater that affect
public trust uses in the Scott River.289 The decision was heralded by environmentalists, who have long urged that water
law better account for the interdependence of ground and
surface water resources.290 However, it was equally decried by
advocates for property rights holders, including the farmers
and ranchers who had been withdrawing groundwater that
was the subject of this litigation for commercial purposes.291
Later that year, when the defendant county appealed this
decision to the California Supreme Court, the high court
denied review, making the Court of Appeal’s decision the
final word in the case.292

3.

Duty of Ongoing Supervision

Finally, and perhaps most concerning to water managers throughout the western United States, the California
Supreme Court articulated in Mono Lake a duty of ongoing oversight for public trust resources.293 Conceptually, this
was necessary to overcome the time lag between Los Angeles’
original grant of the diversion licenses in 1940 and the filing
of litigation forty years later.294 Mono Lake was not the first
case to apply the doctrine in the context of water rights—it
followed a recent North Dakota case requiring consideration
of the impacts of a new consumptive permit on existing and
future supply295 —but it was the first to do so retroactively.
In the Mono Lake case, the court held that there is no statute
of limitations on public trust claims; the state has an ongoing duty to supervise public trust resources and consider its
responsibilities under the doctrine.296 This ongoing obliga289. Id.
290. Richard Frank, California Court Finds Public Trust Doctrine Applies to
State Groundwater Resources, Legal Planet (Aug. 29, 2018), legal-planet.
org/2018/08/29/california-court-finds-public-trust-doctrine-applies-to-stategroundwater-resources/ (reporting that the court declared that “California’s
powerful public trust doctrine applies to at least some of the state’s overtaxed
groundwater resources . . . [and] rejects the argument that California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act displaces the public trust doctrine’s
applicability to groundwater resources”).
291. Pacific Legal Foundation, The State Has No “Public Trust” Power Over Groundwater, https://pacificlegal.org/case/environmental-law-foundation-v-state-water-resources-control-board/ [https://perma.cc/S9BG-GBZ2] (“As amicus on
behalf of property owners and farmers, PLF asks the Court of Appeal to reverse
this unwarranted, vast expansion of the public trust doctrine.”).
292. Order Denying Petition for Review, Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res.
Control Bd., No. S251849 (Cal. Nov. 28, 2018). Since then, much ink has
been spilled over the implications of the decision for California water law and
how it may affect the development and review of groundwater sustainability
plans under California’s 2014 Sustainable Groundwater Management Act. Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, Cal. Water Code §§ 10720–10737.8,
added by Stats.204, c. 346 (S.B. 1168, eff. Jan 1, 2015).
293. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 727.
294. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 606.
295. United Plainsmen Ass’n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm’n, 247
N.W.2d 457, 463, 7 ELR 20117 (N.D. 1976).
296. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 727–28, 732.
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tion of oversight both allowed and required the Water Board
to revisit its past decision, when that decision had failed to
take account of public trust obligations.
In terms of practical impact, this might have been the
biggest legal innovation of all. By implication, it meant
that the state might have to revisit its Mono Lake diversion
decision again in another forty years’ time—or sooner than
that, or later—as circumstances evolve.297 Indeed, it could
require the state to revisit any past decision involving a
navigable waterway for the same reason, or if circumstances
significantly alter the calculus underlying a past decision.
At least in theory, all water allocation or management decisions impacting public trust waterways could be up for
renegotiation, as would be all future decisions.298 The potential ramifications of this duty of ongoing supervision sent
shock waves through the arid west, where diverters feared
what this could mean for the certainty of their rights and
infrastructure.299 The prospect of revisiting management
decisions made without consideration of public trust values threatened to upend many seemingly settled allocation
plans, because before the Mono Lake case called attention to
them, public trust issues were unlikely to have been raised
during the decisionmaking process.300
This point generated considerable controversy, and indeed,
no state has adopted the full Mono Lake doctrine of ongoing
oversight301 except Hawaii, a riparian rights state that operates under a wholly different set of legal and hydrological constraints.302 As noted, some states have gone out of their way
to ensure that they do not follow in California’s footsteps, as
the Idaho Legislature did in statutorily limiting the judicial
evolution of the doctrine.303 Outside of the Mono Basin, even
California has not made much use of the doctrine retrospectively, although the doctrine does now play an important role
in prospective administrative decisionmaking.304

critiques soon emerged from advocates for private property
rights, advocates for greater separation of powers, and even
some environmentalists.306
The most vociferous critique comes from the property
rights community. Property rights advocates worry about
how quickly the modern public trust doctrine has developed, and the new interests it has been interpreted to protect.307 They decry the way they see the doctrine putting a
fist on the scale on the side of public interests at the expense
of established private interests in water resources protected
by the trust.308 They are concerned about the trajectory of
public trust disputes when the doctrine seems so malleable,
encompassing new values as they become recognized—and
especially if public trust decisions can be revisited over time
through a duty of ongoing oversight.309
Another critique has arisen from those concerned with
the legal process ramifications of the public trust doctrine.310
These critics worry about the separation of powers implication of a doctrine that allows the judiciary to second-guess
legislative and executive decisionmaking.311 They view judicial encroachment on policy decisions with skepticism, given
that the judiciary is “the least democratic branch,” in comparison with the others that are more directly beholden to
electing constituents.312 Legal Process critics are troubled by
the idea that unelected judges could countermand the popular will, and that even in states where judges are elected, their
decisions could maintain precedential value long after a judge
leaves office.313 To these champions of the political branches,
the public trust doctrine seems not only antidemocratic but
potentially destabilizing to the rule of law.314
Finally, while most environmentalist love the public trust
doctrine, the Mono Lake decision also produced an environmentalist critique, one that I have previously referred to as
“The Green Dissent.”315 Leading that charge thirty years ago

C.

306. For a fuller analysis, see id. at 617–22; Ryan, supra note 4, at Chapter VII.
307. Id. at 615, 618−19; James L. Huffman, A Fish out of Water: The Public Trust
Doctrine in a Constitutional Democracy, 19 Envtl. L. 527, 533 (1989) (identifying the doctrine as a creature of property law that has been distorted by the
courts beyond its proper boundaries); Barton H. Thompson Jr., The Public
Trust Doctrine: A Conservative Reconstruction and Defense, 15 Se. Envtl. L.J.
47, 49 (2006) (suggesting reconstruction of the public trust doctrine in response to libertarian and property rights critiques); Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 29 Cal. W. L. Rev. 239, 274–76
(1992) (criticizing the public trust doctrine’s effects on private property rights);
see also Rose, supra note 31, at 711–13, 717; (recognizing the inevitable conflict between the public trust and private property rights and considering what
type of property can, under competing notions of public trust, be considered
inherently public). But see Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7
Cato J. 411, 428–30 (1987) (analyzing the public trust doctrine from a similarly libertarian, property rights perspective, but supporting it as a natural limitation on government power, comparable to restrictions on eminent domain).
308. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 615, 618–19.
309. Id. at 615−19; Thompson, supra note 307, at 47, 48–49.
310. See, e.g., Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 617–18; Thompson, supra
note 307, at 48–49; William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public
Trust: Process-Based Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the
Search for a Substantive Environmental Value, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 385, 432
(1997).
311. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 618.
312. Id.
313. See Huffman, supra note 307, at 533.
314. Id.
315. See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Public Trust & Distrust: Theoretical Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine for Natural Resource Management, 31 Envtl. L. 477, 492–93

Post-Decision Pushback

In the context of the Mono Lake story, it is easy to paint a
heroic portrait of the public trust doctrine. After the Mono
Lake litigation, the doctrine emerged as a darling of the wider
environmentalist community—the unlikely savior of a treasured place against the forces of those with far greater power.
Many celebrated the David-and-Goliath result, in which a
rag-tag collection of local scientists and bird watchers organized around a kitchen table somehow defeated one of the
largest and most powerful cities in the world.305 However,
not everyone was so enamored with the doctrine. Important
297. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 608.
298. Id. at 611–12.
299. Id. at 608−11.
300. Id. at 609, 611−12.
301. Id.
302. In re Water Use Permit Applications for the Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 445
(Haw. 2000).
303. See supra notes 269−74 and accompanying text (discussing Idaho’s legislative
abrogation of the common-law doctrine).
304. See generally David Owen, The Mono Lake Case, the Public Trust Doctrine, and
the Administrative State, 45 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1099 (2012).
305. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 603–09.
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was Richard Lazarus, now a leading professor of environmental law at Harvard Law School.316 He famously criticized
the environmentalist embrace of the doctrine, arguing that it
would take the burgeoning environmental law movement—
which had come of age barely ten years earlier in the 1970s—
in the entirely wrong direction.317
Central to the Green Dissent was the position that it was
a mistake to embrace the tools and vocabulary of property
law to accomplish the stewardship-oriented goals of environmental law.318 As Lazarus explained, the public trust doctrine emphasizes such property law concepts as public and
private ownership of resources, trustees and beneficiaries,
and so forth.319 Instead of infusing environmental law with
property concepts, he maintained that environmental law
should embrace stewardship concepts more consistent with
new environmental statutes such as NEPA and the Clean Air
and Water Acts, and the emerging principles of administrative law.320 The stewardship approach obliges the state to protect valued resource independently from ownership, public
or otherwise.321 After all, if we base environmental protection obligations on public ownership, then what happens if
a fickle public suddenly decides it would be more valuable to
put up a parking lot?
Accordingly, not everybody loves the public trust doctrine
as it stands, nor does everyone cheer where it may be headed.
These critiques warrant mention, especially as new developments push the doctrine into territory not previously recognized in U.S. law.

V.

The Contested Future:
An Atmospheric Trust

After Mono Lake, environmentalist appeals to the doctrine
surged, although successes were mostly limited to contexts
involving waterways.322 There have been important new
applications in the context of water resources, including California’s extension of the Mono Lake doctrine to groundwater
tributaries in the Scott River case,323 the protection of public
beach access in New Jersey,324 public walking rights along
Great Lakes shores,325 and the protection of public drinking
water from hydraulic fracturing under Pennsylvania’s constitutionalized version of the doctrine.326
(2001); Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 616, 620–21; Thompson,
supra note 307, at 48–49; Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property
and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71
Iowa L. Rev. 631, 715–16 (1986); Araiza, supra note 310, at 387–89.
316. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 315, at 715–16.
317. Id.
318. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 617−620.
319. Lazarus, supra note 315, at 648, 642−43.
320. Id. at 680−81 n.308, 684; Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 617−20.
321. Id.
322. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 490.
323. See supra notes 287−91.
324. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 363 (N.J. 1984).
325. Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58 (Mich. 2005); Scott River Litigation: Envtl.
Law Found. v. Cty. of Siskiyou, No. C083239 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2018);
see also Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 625.
326. See Dernbach, supra note 91, at 464; see also Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note
3, at 624.
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Yet, all along, litigants and scholars have tried to understand the proper extent of the doctrine. Is it a background
principle of state law that can function as a defense to takings
litigation?327 If it applies to waterways, then which waterways? All of them, or only some subset?328 And if it protects
waterways as public commons against private monopoly or
appropriation, then why not apply the same rule to other
critical natural resources that are also susceptible to appropriation or monopoly?329 Why not to fisheries? Why not to
biodiversity? And perhaps most to the point, as we face down
the increasingly violent effects of climate change, why not to
the atmospheric commons?
Indeed, recall the original Justinian statement of the doctrine that I introduced at the beginning of this Article, which
explicitly named “the air” among the select public commons
protected by the doctrine, together with the running water,
the sea, and the shores.330
To that end, University of Oregon Prof. Mary Wood has
advocated that the public trust doctrine should apply to the
atmosphere.331 She argues that we should seek public trust
protection for the air commons and the climate system
bound up with that enables life on earth as we know it.332
Inspired by her scholarship, environmental advocates have
launched the atmospheric trust litigation project,333 now
spearheaded by the nonprofit organization, Our Children’s
Trust,334 which has assisted youth plaintiffs around the country in bringing suits and administrative action seeking public
trust protection for the atmosphere.335 The named plaintiff in
the most important of these cases, Juliana v. United States,

327. See supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text, discussing the use of the doctrine as a defense to takings claims.
328. See, e.g., Kramer v. City of Lake Oswego, 285 Or. App. 181, 196-291 (2017)
(declining plaintiff’s request to clarify that the public trust doctrine applies to
all submerged lands and overlying waters, not just those owned by the state).
329. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 622.
330. See J. Inst. Proemium, 2.1.1., supra note 16; see also supra Section I.A.1.
331. See generally Mary Christina Wood, Nature’s Trust: Environmental Law
for a New Ecological Age (2014).
332. Id.
333. See, e.g., Erin Ryan et al., Juliana v. United States: Debating the Fundamentals of
a Fundamental Right to a Sustainable Climate, 46 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. Online
*1 (2018) (analyzing the unfolding atmospheric trust litigation in the context
of Juliana v. United States) [hereinafter Ryan et al., Debating Juliana]; Blumm
& Wood, supra note 265 (discussing Juliana v. United States and all other atmospheric trust litigation and administrative actions); Randall S. Abate, Atmospheric Trust Litigation in the United States: Pipe Dream or Pipeline to Justice
for Future Generations?, in Climate Justice: Case Studies in Global and
Regional Governance Challenges 542 (Randall S. Abate ed., 2016); Ryan,
The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 629.
334. Our Mission, Our Children’s Trust, https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/
mission-statement [https://perma.cc/BWP7-KK8H]:
Our Children’s Trust elevates the voice of youth to secure the legal
right to a stable climate and healthy atmosphere for the benefit of all
present and future generations. . . . We lead a game-changing legal
campaign seeking systemic, science-based emissions reductions and
climate recovery policy at all levels of government. We give young
people, those with most at stake in the climate crisis, a voice to favorably impact their futures.
335. See State Judicial Actions Now Pending, Our Children’s Trust, https://www.
ourchildrenstrust.org/pending-state-actions [https://perma.cc/GX2C-W5F9]
(describing pending actions in Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, and Washington); Other Proceedings in All 50 States, Our Children’s Trust, https://www.ourchildrenstrust.
org/other-proceedings-in-all-50-states [https://perma.cc/LVC7-8R62].
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was a teenager when she and eighteen other youth plaintiffs
first filed the case in 2015.336
The plaintiffs in these cases maintain that the government holds the air commons in trust for the people, just as
it does navigable waterways—and that both federal and state
governments are failing their trust obligations to protect it
from polluters, who are wrongfully using the atmosphere as a
carbon sink.337 More importantly, they say, the atmospheric
commons is a congestible resource that is being used up.
The specific public trust argument is that by not regulating
greenhouse gas pollution, the federal and state governments
are allowing private appropriators to appropriate the air commons as a private dumping ground, and at the expense of the
public interest for future generations in a livable world.338 The
fact that the youth plaintiffs are, themselves, members of the
future generation makes their claim all the more arresting.339
Juliana had been slated for trial before Judge Ann Aiken
of the Federal District of Oregon in October of 2018, having
defeated several motions to dismiss.340 However, the case was
stalled after the Donald Trump Administration filed multiple petitions for the writ of mandamus, a rare judicial remedy by which the Administration sought to convince a higher
court to force Judge Aiken to reverse herself and dismiss the
case.341 Two of these petitions were appealed unsuccessfully
to the Supreme Court, but the latter received noteworthy
attention in the order denying it.342 The Court once again
declined the petition,343 but the order included language suggesting this was because relief might still be available from
a preferable judicial forum, the Ninth Circuit.344 Despite
336. 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 46 ELR 20072 (D. Or. 2016). Together with other
public trust scholars, I have participated in the professor amicus briefs on the
side of the plaintiffs in this case.
337. Id. at 1233, 1253.
338. Id. at 1233, 1245; see also Ryan et al., Debating Juliana, supra note 333 (Wood
on government responsibility for climate change); see also Ryan, The Historic
Saga, supra note 3, at 625–31 (discussing the atmospheric trust project before
the filing of Juliana v. United States, which corrected some of the strategic issues in the first batch of cases).
339. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 627.
340. See Juliana v. United States—Major Court Orders and Filings, Our Children’s Trust, https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/court-orders-and-pleadings
[https://perma.cc/U66Z-JGY5] (listing all motions).
341. Id.; Adam Wernick, Circuit Court Declines to Halt Climate Case Brought by
Youth Plaintiffs, Pub. Radio Int’l (Apr. 14, 2018), https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-04-14/circuit-court-declines-halt-climate-case-brought-youthplaintiffs [https://perma.cc/46LF-T6RE]; see also In re United States, 884 F.3d
830, 838 (9th Cir. 2018).
342. In re United States, 139 S. Ct. 452, 586 U.S. (No. 18A410, Nov. 2, 2018),
https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/18A410-In-ReUnited-States-Order.pdf.
343. Id.
344. The Court’s order implied that the Ninth Circuit had previously dismissed the
government’s efforts to dismiss the case for reasons that may no longer be valid:
At this time . . . the Government’s petition for a writ of mandamus
does not have a “fair prospect” of success in this Court because
adequate relief may be available in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. . . . Although the Ninth Circuit has
twice denied the Government’s request for mandamus relief, it did so
without prejudice. And the court’s basis for denying relief rested, in
large part, on the early stage of the litigation, the likelihood that plaintiffs’ claims would narrow as the case progressed, and the possibility
of attaining relief through ordinary dispositive motions. Those reasons
are, to a large extent, no longer pertinent. The 50-day trial was scheduled to begin on October 29, 2018, and is being held in abeyance only
because of the current administrative stay.
Id.
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her previous decision to allow the case to go forward, Judge
Aiken acknowledged the Supreme Court’s implied suggestion by certifying the question of whether the trial should
proceed to the Ninth Circuit on interlocutory appeal.345 As
this piece goes to press, the trial is once again on hold. After
hearing arguments on the motion to dismiss in early June
2019, the Ninth Circuit is now deliberating whether to allow
the case to go to trial.346
Juliana has generated enormous interest, but the case faces
high legal hurdles.347 First, the plaintiffs must convince the
federal judiciary that the obligations of the public trust apply
to the federal government, which is best positioned to regulate greenhouse gas pollution in the United States.348 In fact,
the Supreme Court recently issued dicta emphasizing that
the doctrine is strictly a matter of state law, which will be a
challenge for the plaintiffs.349 Nevertheless, the plaintiffs seek
to distinguish this dicta based on its context,350 and emphasize that if the public trust doctrine is an attribute of sovereign authority, then it must be an attribute of all sovereign
authority, and not just that at the state level.351 In addition,
states beyond the original thirteen colonies that inherited
the public trust doctrine as an attribute of sovereignty upon
statehood must have received it through the sovereignty conferred by the federal government, suggesting a further basis
for a federal trust obligation.352
Perhaps more importantly, the plaintiffs must convince
the court that the public trust doctrine should apply to atmospheric resources, which would represent a substantial extension of the doctrine as it has been thus far understood in
the United States. Judge Aiken initially sustained the claim
against a motion to dismiss on this ground, sidestepping the
atmospheric trust issue by holding that the plaintiffs had also
alleged cognizable claims of harm to coastal resources that
are clearly protected by the public trust doctrine.353 However,
the Juliana plaintiffs have bolstered this element of their law345. Order at 6, Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-CV-01517-AA, 2018 WL
6303774 (D. Or. filed Nov. 21, 2018).
346. See Brandi Buchman, Inaugural Hearing of House Climate Group Gathers Young
Voices, Courthouse News Serv. (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.courthousenews.com/inaugural-hearing-of-house-climate-group-gathers-young-voices/
[https://perma.cc/MU8D-SXMY] (reporting the anticipated trial date); Juliana v. United States—Youth Climate Lawsuit, Our Children’s Trust, https://
www.ourchildrenstrust.org/juliana-v-us [https://perma.cc/LV8J-EQBM].
347. See, e.g., Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. App’x 7, 44 ELR 20130
(D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, No. 14-405, 2014 WL 6860603 (U.S. Dec. 8,
2014) (dismissing a similar claim brought in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit in 2014); see also Ryan, The Historic Saga,
supra note 3, at 628–30 (discussing legal hurdles for the atmospheric trust
litigation, but before the filing of Juliana v. United States, which corrected some
of the strategic issues in the early cases).
348. Ryan, The Historical Saga, supra note 3, at 628–29.
349. See PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 556 U.S. 576 (2012).
350. See Ryan et al., Debating Juliana, supra note 333 (presenting Rick Frank’s argument that Court’s passing statement in the PPL Montana dicta cannot resolve
the larger issue in a fully different factual context).
351. See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 46 ELR 20072 (D. Or.
2016); see also supra Part IV.A. (discussing the public trust doctrine as a
constraint on sovereignty); Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 574−75
(discussing scholarly interpretations of the public trust doctrine as an attribute of sovereignty).
352. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 575, 45; Michael Blumm & Lynn
Schaffer, The Federal Public Trust Doctrine: Misinterpreting Justice Kennedy and
Illinois Central Railroad, 45 Envtl. L. 257, 399−405 (2015).
353. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224.
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suit by adding an ambitious substantive due process claim
for violation of their fundamental right to a livable climate,
implicating both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the doctrine of unenumerated fundamental
rights under the Ninth Amendment.354
In her dramatic ruling on the defendant’s motion to dismiss, Judge Aiken originally held that the plaintiffs could
move forward with their suit, concluding that there was a
substantive due process right to a climate system capable of
sustaining human life.355 Analogizing to the fundamental
right to marry that the Supreme Court had recognized earlier
the same year,356 Judge Aiken opined:
“[As to t]he idea is that certain rights may be necessary to
enable the exercise of other rights, whether enumerated or
unenumerated. . . . Exercising my ‘reasoned judgment,’ I
have no doubt that the right to a climate system capable of
sustaining human life is fundamental to a free and ordered
society. Just as marriage is the ‘foundation of the family,’
a stable climate system is quite literally the foundation ‘of
society, without which there would be neither civilization
nor progress.”357

Importantly, Judge Aiken did not conclude that the plaintiffs’ rights had actually been violated in this case, only that
they would have the opportunity to try and prove that violation in court. Even if the plaintiffs prevail at the district court
level, the odds are stacked against them on appeal, especially
if the case reaches the Supreme Court.358 Nevertheless, the
recognition of a fundamental right to climate security would
be a landmark ruling for the federal bench, if it is not extinguished by a contrary decision by the Ninth Circuit in the
summer of 2019.
On top of everything else, the case raises difficult questions of remedy: if the plaintiffs actually prevail, what can
they realistically expect a court to do to vindicate their
claim?359 Courts ordinarily do not order legislative or executive action. But these plaintiffs argue that climate change,
and what they allege as the government’s complicity in creating it, is no ordinary circumstance.360 In addressing the
issue of redressability to achieve standing to bring their suit,
the plaintiffs persuaded at least Judge Aiken that they had
framed a violation of their rights that was the proper subject
354. Id.
355. Id. at 1231–32; see also Ryan et al., Debating Juliana, supra note 333 (Wood
and Irma Russel discussing the fundamental right to a livable climate).
356. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that the fundamental
right to marry under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
applies equally, across all fifty states, to same-sex couples as it does to oppositesex couples).
357. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1231−32.
358. Ryan et al., Debating Juliana, supra note 333 (Huffman on the assertion of a
positive right, Frank on the odds of overturning a decision favorable to the
plaintiffs on appeal).
359. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 46 ELR 20072 (D. Or. 2016)
(briefing on requested remedy).
360. Ryan et al., Debating Juliana, supra note 333 (Huffman and Wood debating the
requested remedy); Brief for Petitioner at 23–28, Juliana v. United States, No.
18-36082 (9th Cir. filed Feb. 26, 2019).
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of judicial review,361 and that the defendant agencies possessed the power to redress their claim, using existing regulatory resources, by developing a remedial plan to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions.362
Juliana is not the first legal action premised on the atmospheric trust, nor will it be the last.363 Parallel atmospheric
trust cases have been unfolding throughout the nation at the
state and federal levels, with incremental judicial success364
and some noteworthy success through administrative process.365 One atmospheric trust petition successfully forced
the creation of an executive climate action plan in Massachusetts.366 Atmospheric trust cases are also being brought
in other countries, including Uganda and India,367 inspired
not only by Juliana but by the 2015 Urgenda Foundation v.
Netherlands climate lawsuit that, citing a sovereign obligation

361. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 41–44.
362. Id.; see also Blumm & Wood, supra note 265, at 71–72.
363. Blumm & Wood, supra note 265, 67–77 (discussing state-based atmospheric
trust litigation).
364. The early judicial cases show a mix of failures and incremental successes. Many
were dismissed on displacement, preemption, or political question grounds.
E.g., Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 15, 42 ELR 20115 (D.D.C.
2012) (inter alia, dismissing ATL federal suit on the basis of displacement by
Clean Air Act); Chernaik v. Kitzhaber, 328 P.3d 799, 808 (Or. Ct. App. 2014)
(reversing lower court’s dismissal based on the political question doctrine, separation-of-powers doctrine, sovereign immunity, and the court’s perceived lack
of authority to grant requested relief ).
		 Later cases began to erode initially negative precedent, though few produced the sought-after relief. See, e.g., Kanuk ex rel. Kanuk v. State of Alaska,
Dep’t of Natural Res., 335 P.3d 1088 (Alaska 2014) (holding that the political question doctrine did not foreclose plaintiff’s suit, but rejecting the relief
sought); Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221, 1225 (N.M. Ct. App.
2015) (holding that the New Mexico constitution recognizes public trust
protection of the atmosphere but concluding that claims must be based on
existing constitutional or statutory processes); Bonser-Lain v. Tex. Comm’n
on Envtl. Quality, No. D-1-GN-11-002194, 2012 WL 2946041 (Tex. Dist.
Ct. July 9, 2012), vacated, 438 S.W.3d 887 (Tex. App. 2014) (in a case later
vacated on unrelated grounds, rejecting the agency’s determination that the
public trust doctrine applies only to water, and affirming that the federal Clean
Air Act provides “a floor, not a ceiling, for the protection of air quality”).
		 Several provide useful foundation for future success in atmospheric trust
cases by recognizing the application of the public trust doctrine to the atmospheric commons. See, e.g., Foster v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, No. 14-2-252951 SEA, 2015 WL 7721362, at *4, 45 ELR 20223 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19,
2015) (expressly holding that the public trust includes air and atmosphere);
Butler ex rel. Peshlakai v. Brewer, No. 1 CA-CV 12-0347, 2013 WL 1091209
(Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2013) (assuming without deciding that the atmosphere is a part of the public trust subject to the public trust doctrine).
365. Blumm & Wood, supra note 265, 73–77 (discussing administrative relief in
Massachusetts and Washington).
366. On Sept. 16, 2016, the governor of Massachusetts responded to a win in court
by atmospheric trust youth plaintiffs by issuing Executive Order No. 569,
establishing an Integrated Climate Change Strategy for the Commonwealth.
See Legal Updates: Sept. 16, 2016, Our Children’s Trust, https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/massachusetts/ [https://perma.cc/H27W-DG89]; see also
Blumm & Wood, supra note 265, 272–74 (discussing Kain v. Mass. Dep’t of
Envtl. Protection, 49 N.E.3d 1124, 1128 (Mass. 2016), the litigation leading
to this executive order).
367. Mbabazi & Others v. Attorney Gen. & Nat’l Envtl. Mgmt. Auth., Civil Suit
No. 283, High Court of Uganda Holden at Kampala (Sept. 20, 2012) (decision pending), http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/
wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2012/20120920_CivilSuit-No.-283-of-2012_complaint-1.pdf; Pandey v. India, National Green Tribunal at Principal Bench, New Delhi (2017) (undecided), http://blogs2.law.
columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-uscase-documents/2017/20170325_Original-Application-No.-___-of-2017_
petition-1.pdf; see also Climate Litigation Databases, Sabin Center for Climate
Change Law (2019), http://climatecasechart.com/?cn-reloaded=1.
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to protect the environment, required the Dutch government
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 25%.368
It will be fascinating to see how Juliana and the other
atmospheric trust claims unfold. Many have speculated
that these cases simply reach too far from established legal
norms, and that they will inevitably fail as they progress
through legal channels toward the Supreme Court, even if
they succeed at trial or on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.369 The
claims implicate each of the critiques raised after the Mono
Lake case: property rights advocates worry about the everexpanding doctrine that eats all in its path, environmental
critics worry about the bad precedent that losses along the
way might create for more promising avenues of regulating
greenhouse gases, and legal process critics worry about the
separation of powers implications of the requested remedy.370
Nevertheless, the Juliana case recalls of one of the most
powerful features of the public trust doctrine, one that implicates the separation of powers controversy, but with a twist.
It is the way that the doctrine enables citizens to use the
levers made available by the horizontal separation of powers to increase their efficacy in democratic participation, by
invoking judicial review of legislative or executive action
that violates legal rules. This is a feature of our democratic
design, hallowed in the United States since Marbury v. Madison.371 The Juliana plaintiffs may not succeed in their lawsuit, but the very act of bringing it, and generating so much
public support for their claim, puts pressure on the political
branches in ways that amplify their voices as individual voters and constituents.372
For example, the Juliana case has generated grassroots
support from over 36,000 individual young people, each
of whom signed on to an open amicus brief supporting the
plaintiffs’ claims, and the list of supporters continues to
grow.373 The children’s brief, as it has become known, begins:
Children are people and citizens. The Constitution protects
the fundamental rights of children as fully as it does the
rights of adults. The Constitution states clearly it intends to
“secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” We are the Posterity the Constitution protects. Scientific studies show that government actions today, including
its actions of authorizing greenhouse gas discharges and subsidizing fossil fuel extraction, development, consumption,
and exportation, imperil plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to
368. C/09/456689/HA ZA 13-1396 (Neth. June 24, 2015), https://uitspraken.
rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196.
369. E.g., Ryan et al., Debating Juliana, supra note 333 (Huffman critiquing the
claims on these grounds).
370. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 621−22 (and sources cited therein).
371. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the principle that courts may strike
down government actions that violate constitutional rules).
372. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 630−31.
373. Brief of Amicus Curiae Zero Hour on Behalf of Approximately 32,340 Children
and Young People in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees, Juliana v. United States, 217
F. Supp. 3d 1224, 46 ELR 20072 (D. Or. 2016), https://www.joinjuliana.
org/joinjuliana_files/201931FinalYoungPeoplesBrief.pdf (last visited Apr. 10,
2019); see also Zero Hour Movement, Join the Youth Legal Action for a Safe
Climate, https://www.joinjuliana.org [https://perma.cc/EV8Y-3ENT] (noting that the brief was filed with over 36,000 names in support, and inviting
continued signatories while the case works its anticipated way toward the
Supreme Court).
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life, liberty, and property. The government’s fossil fuel policies and actions threaten to push our climate system over
tipping points into catastrophe. We ask the Court to grant
plaintiffs the opportunity to try their case and prove the
harms caused and intensified by governmental action.374

On the matter of the atmospheric trust, the brief continues:
As the Constitution protects our fundamental rights, the
Public Trust Principle protects our inheritance of resources.
It articulates the legal duty of the government, as the trustee
of property held in common, to conserve our vital natural
resources. The government holds and manages the public
trust for us, the trust beneficiaries. The government is obligated to protect our inheritance of, and refrain from substantially impairing and alienating, the natural resources
upon which all life and liberty depend. “The beneficiaries
of the public trust are not just present generations but those
to come.”375

Widespread attention generated by cases like Juliana and
Urgenda, together with other focal points of youth activism,
including the leadership of Swedish teenager Greta Thunberg, have inspired a growing chorus of youth climate protests worldwide, including the International Climate Strike
on March 15, 2019, in which young people from every
inhabited continent marched out of school to protest their
governments’ failures to respond to the increasing urgency
of scientific climate predictions.376 Even if Juliana is dismissed by the Ninth Circuit, the case has helped coalesce a
youth movement that no motion to dismiss can undo.
Indeed, the atmospheric trust cases reveal that “the separation of powers” is not the same thing as those powers working
in complete isolation.377 Citizens’ appeal to the judicial process is rightly part of the wider political process. The ability
to seek judicial review is especially important when citizens
have felt silenced within the wider political process for unjust
reasons, such as invidious discrimination378 or government
corruption.379 The public trust doctrine thus facilitates a conversation between the three branches of government about
the disposition of critical public natural resource commons

374. Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 373, at 5–6.
375. Id. (quoting Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158,
169, 23 ELR 20348 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991)).
376. Harmeet Kaur & Madison Park, Young Environmental Activists Across the World
Skip School in a Call to Action, CNN (Mar. 15, 2019, 3:14 pm), https://www.
cnn.com/2019/03/15/world/climate-strike-students/index.html (“The movement, inspired by the actions of 16-year-old Swedish environmental activist
Greta Thunberg, spanned more than 100 countries and 1,500 cities, where
students gathered in the streets and at their state capitols to call for action.”);
see also Pictures From Youth Climate Strikes Around the World, N.Y. Times (Mar.
15, 2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/climate/climate-schoolstrikes.html:
From Sydney to Seoul, Cape Town to New York, children skipped
school en masse Friday to demand action on climate change. It was a
stark display of the alarm of a generation. It was also a glimpse of the
anger directed at older people who have not, in the protesters’ view,
taken global warming seriously enough.
377. Ryan et al., Debating Juliana, supra note 333 (Ryan opening statement).
378. E.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
379. See supra notes 60−85 and accompanying text, discussing the Illinois Central.
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in which all citizens have a stake, but which are often managed far beyond the reach of the average voter’s influence.380
Viewed this way, it is not that the judiciary is antidemocratically second-guessing the political branches—the second-guessing at issue is by citizens legitimately invoking their
rights to the judicial process. And especially for the Juliana
plaintiffs and supporters, many of whom are too young to
vote, it is one of their only means of democratic participation.
Viewed this way, the role of judicial review within the
political process is a gambit of good governance. We would
not want every disgruntled voter to make a federal case out
of every grievance, and to that end, the rules of standing
generally operate to screen out those with least merit. But
the gambit succeeds if the claim is legitimate enough to
withstand procedural barriers, and compelling enough to
motivate public support within the wider political process.
In the ongoing and recursive dialectic between law and
culture, a compelling case can sometimes change the conversation, even if it does not immediately change the law.
For another example, consider the evolution of the Supreme
Court’s gay rights jurisprudence over the last thirty years—
a stunning progression that tracked the evolution of cultural
norms, themselves influenced by compelling examples of
civil rights litigation.381
Juliana and the other atmospheric trust cases may yet
prove a successful gambit for the plaintiffs, even if they
fail to prevail in the judicial process. The children bringing these suits have generated unusual public support and
international interest.382 Something about their argument
has struck a chord with many ordinary people, motivating
greater interest in the efficacy of good climate governance to
protect the atmospheric commons on which we all depend.
The Juliana public trust claim reaches them in the same way
the Mono Lake case reached ordinary people who never mustered excitement about the important public trust legal developments in Marks.383 And indeed, this is how our political
process, incorporating all three branches of government, is
supposed to work. As in all complex policy dilemmas, the
procedural mechanics of governance are reinforced by political safeguards.384

Conclusion: Navigating Public and Private
Interests in Natural Resource Commons
The public trust doctrine has long played a critical role in
helping us navigate the protection of public and private interests that collide in natural resource commons. All public
resource commons are complicated by the demands that indi380. Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 630−31.
381. Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding state laws
criminalizing gay sex), with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 553 (2003) (overturning Bowers), and Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (establishing a
constitutional right to gay marriage).
382. See, e.g., Wernick, supra note 341.
383. 491 P.2d 374, 380, 2 ELR 20049 (Cal. 1971) (expanding public trust protections to ecological, habitat, open space, climatic, and scenic values).
384. Cf. Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political
Process (1980) (discussing the importance of political safeguards in
good governance).
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viduals place on their share of a common pool. Sometimes,
the common pool is more easily disaggregated, as when one
individual takes a quantity of water from a waterway, or a
single member from a species of biodiversity. Other times, it
may be harder to disaggregate commons values, as when one
individual erects a weir preventing all else from navigating
the waterway, or in the climate context, where one polluter’s
use of the atmosphere as a carbon sink equally compromises
everyone else’s share. But in all cases, over-exploitation of the
commons by some individuals can compromise the resource
for all—or in the worst case, destroy it.
The public trust doctrine represents one of the earliest
known mechanisms for regulating natural resource commons
problems. It first did so by recognizing these resources as
public commons, belonging to everyone equally, as set forth
in ancient Roman law.385 Later, it added recognition of the
sovereign authority to maintain these resources for the public, as affirmed by early British386 and American law.387 More
recently, it has been understood to confer sovereign responsibility to affirmatively protect these resources for the public,
as recognized by the Mono Lake case and its progeny.388
As the California Supreme Court recognized in Mono
Lake, the doctrine does not foreclose private use of public
commons. The Mono Lake case affirmed a variety of legitimate private uses of the water commons at issue there—recreational use, scientific inquiry, commercial exploitation, and
sheer aesthetic beauty, among others—so long as these private uses did not compromise the sustainability of the underlying res, the thing held in trust. For example, the public
trust doctrine did not prevent the state’s decision to allocate
Mono Basin water for municipal use in Los Angeles—so long
as doing so did not destroy the public trust values at Mono
Lake. The Scott River case does not forbid all groundwater
extraction in the basis, so long as public trust values in the
river are maintained. The Juliana plaintiffs are seeking a climate action plan that balances legitimate needs for economic
development against fundamental rights to climate security.
But the Mono Lake case and its progeny leave much to resolve
in interpreting the role of the public trust doctrine in protecting resource commons going forward.
Each of these cases raise the question: to what resources
should the doctrine apply? Mono Lake applied the doctrine
squarely within the traditional public trust purview of navigable waterways—but the case extended the protections of
the doctrine to new environmental values, farther up the
watershed, and farther out in time. The Scott River followed
directly from Mono Lake, applying the new doctrine protecting non-navigable tributaries of a dependent navigable
waterway—but it extended that rationale to the new context of groundwater management. The Scott River decision is
satisfying to water scholars who critique groundwater law as
long hampered by scientifically uninformed legal doctrines
that artificially separate hydrologically intertwined ground
385. See supra Part I.A.1.
386. See supra Part I.A.2.–3.
387. See supra Part I.A.4.–6.
388. See supra Part III–IV.
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and surface waters—yet it threatens settled expectations created by the old legal regime. Meanwhile, the Juliana case
takes the same public trust rationale—sovereign obligation
to protect a critical public commons from private misappropriation—and applies it in a wholly new context. The idea
of treating the atmosphere as a public commons is as old as
Justinian, but applying the public trust doctrine to protect it
is a relatively new idea.
Next, who should administer the public trust? A defining feature of the common-law doctrine is that it empowers
ordinary citizens to seek redress for public trust violations in
court. Separation-of-powers critics worry that the doctrine
thereby overpowers the judiciary, enabling it to override legislative policymaking. Yet, this critique may be overblown,
not only because it discounts the way that judicial review
further empowers democratic participation, but also because
traditionally the law of trusts has always been interpreted
and enforced by courts. If the trust analogy holds, then who
better than judges to oversee the public beneficiary’s interest
in trust resources against self-serving or neglectful management by the legislative trustee? The government is always
under a duty to protect the public; it is the veritable purpose of government, and the charge underlying the police
power from which it generally operates. But while government decisions under the police power get a lot of judicial
discretion, some public trust obligations are less open to
interpretation. Courts may be the best venue for evaluating government decisions that may transgress the acceptable
margins of interpretation.
Finally, what is the nature of the constraint, and to what
authority does it apply? These are, perhaps, the most interesting and difficult questions raised by the Mono Lake case
and its progeny. The Mono Lake case established the nature
of the trust as something beyond the ken of ordinary common law, without fully resolving the question of its constitutive status. As discussed in Part IV, the extent to which
the common-law doctrine exceeds conventional common-
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law limitations remains debated, although most states that
have addressed the matter follow the California approach
of placing it beyond the reach of ordinary statutory abrogation. This approach seems most consistent with a doctrine
that meaningfully constrains sovereign authority over public
trust resources—limiting what the sovereign can and cannot
do—because a constraint that the sovereign can easily extinguish has no real force.
As for whose sovereign authority it constrains—state or
federal or both—the most theoretically and historically consistent answer is that it constrains all sovereign authority. There
is no doubt that the doctrine constrains the states, based on
centuries of U.S. case law. But if it is appropriately understood
as a limit on sovereign authority over public commons, then
as an intellectual matter, it should not matter whose sovereign
authority is at issue—it constrains whatever authority governs
the relevant commons. This answer also best accounts for the
history of state and federal turn-taking on managing public
trust resources, given that most states inherited their trustimpressed resources through the intervening medium of federal sovereign authority, by which the U.S. government held
these resources until they could be disbursed to new states.389
The Supreme Court’s dicta in PPL Montana characterizing
the doctrine as a feature of state law is definitely problematic
for claims that depend on a federal trust—but that passing,
out-of-context reference should not be authoritative when the
Court properly considers this issue for the first time.390 As it
may well do in the next few years, if the Juliana case or a
related claim makes it to the High Court.
In the meantime, the state and lower courts—and increasingly, legislative and executive actors—will continue to shepherd the protection of public trust values in the separate but
interlocking roles within the political processes of good governance. The doctrine will continue to help us navigate the
inevitable clash between public and private interests in natural resource commons, a clash that is destined to intensify
with the increasing pressure we are putting on public commons resources like air, water, biodiversity, and climate—and
perhaps other commons the law has yet to address. So long
as the doctrine is functioning, under whatever operative legal
theory, we can all take comfort in the knowledge that critical
public commons will have a legal sentry and safeguard.

389. See Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 3, at 573−74:
[T] he public trust doctrine must constrain federal authority, because
the implicit trust obligations of most states arose by delegation of
federal authority over lands previously held in federal ownership. . . .
[Other than the original thirteen colonies, all states inherited their
trust obligations through the medium of federal sovereignty that applied before their lands were carved out of federal holdings. The states
must have inherited a pre-existing trust obligation . . . because there
is no clear legal moment when new trust obligations were expressly
conferred. Therefore, the doctrine must have implicitly inhered at the
federal level before it was delegated to the states, and by this theory,
it remains there in application to all trust resources that were not delegated to the states.
390. See Ryan et al., Debating Juliana, supra note 333 (Frank discussing the PPL
Montana dicta).
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